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Abstract 
This paper examines the stock price impact of new product announcements on the consumer 
electronic market by conducting event studies. Cumulative average abnormal returns are 
estimated for event windows of different lengths centered on the new product announcements. 
Cumulative abnormal idiosyncratic risk is estimated for the same event windows with the 
intention to research if new product announcements are associated with increased risk. Three 
out of five event windows are found to have positive cumulative average abnormal returns and 
all five event windows are found to have an increase in idiosyncratic risk on average. Different 
trading strategies are presented that can be adopted to exploit the empirical results. 
Keywords:  Event Study, Cumulative Average Abnormal Return, Cumulative Abnormal 
Idiosyncratic Risk  
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1. Introduction 
In high technology industries, such as the consumer electronic industry, a continuous and quick 
launch of new products is essential for the future prosperity of a firm. A McKinsey & Co (1991) 
study reports that if shipments of products are six months late, the firm, on average, loses 33% 
of after-tax profits. This compared to losses of 3.5% when product development costs exceed 
the predicted cost by 50%. Cohen et al. (1997) called successful new products “engines of 
growth” and Chaney et al. (1991) stated that for firms to generate future profitability it is 
required that they do not let their product lines become obsolete. Mahajan and Wind (1991) 
found that 25% of firm sales, on average, are generated by products introduced within the last 
three years. Stalk (1988) coined the term time-based competition in order to emphasize the 
importance of time-to-market1.  
Furthermore, in several empirical studies (e.g. Cooper & Kleinschmidt 1987; Zurger and 
Maidique 1990) it has been concluded that the success of new products not only depends on 
continuous and quick launches, but on performance, specifications and value to consumers. 
To summarize above research; 20 to 30 years ago, the importance of quick time-to-market, 
product performance and product value to customers were identified. Quick time-to-market 
development strategies have been adopted by firms such as General Electric and Hewlett 
Packard (Cohen et al., 1996). Another example is Sony Mobile Communications who recently 
attempted to launch their flagship mobile series Xperia Z twice a year in order to win market 
shares2, rather than the once a year launch adopted by competitors such as Samsung Electronics 
(Galaxy S series) and Apple (iPhone series) (Bell, 2014). 
An exemplary example of a consumer electronics firm who failed to meet specification 
expectations and thereby lost value to consumers was Nokia, who lost its once mighty position 
in the mobile phone industry. Nokia was initially hesitant to adopt new technologies such as 
touch screens and apps and chose to continue developing the mobile phone, rather than focusing 
on smartphones, the fastest growing segment of the market. In 2009 Nokia reported a $1.36 
billion loss due to 20% loss in sales. This should be compared to the $1.63 billion profit the 
previous year (O’Brien, 2009). In 2011 Nokia and Microsoft announced a partnership to make 
the Windows Phone operating system the primary operating system for Nokia smartphones. 
The Windows Phone only managed to account for 3.7% of the smartphone market, and on 
                                                          
1 The time it takes for a product to go from an idea to be available for sale (Kahn, 2004, pp. 173-187).  
2 A strategy quickly abandoned due to high costs and critique of similarities in specifications between the 
updated product and its predecessor (Spence, 2015). 
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September 3rd 2013, Microsoft announced the acquisition of the handset and services business 
of Nokia (Wingfield, 2013). On October 21st 2014 Microsoft made it official that they would 
start to phase out the Nokia brand and replace it with the Lumia brand name (Warren, 2014). 
In summary, the importance of continuous and quick new product launches (particularly in high 
technology industries) that meet consumer expectations has been known for decades. Firms 
have adopted this knowledge in pursuit of future prosperity, and those who failed to do so have 
suffered devastating consequences. The importance of new products from a long time 
perspective seems to be beyond a doubt. What is of great interest is to investigate the actual 
financial effects. Since the importance of new products has been known for decades, it may 
very well be the case that the market expects new products to such a degree that new product 
announcements, whose purpose is to inform potential consumers, are no new information at all. 
To further strengthen the theory that new product announcements are not necessarily new 
information, imagine all pre-announcement media coverage regarding the yearly early-autumn 
Apple event when new iPhones are almost certain to be announced (Painter, 2015).  
Having above theory in mind and applying the efficient market hypothesis to it, which states 
that all available information is integrated in the stock price3 (Fama, 1970) raises a question. 
To what degree (if any) and in what direction (in terms of gains and losses) do new product 
announcements impact firm market value? This question has been raised in previous research 
(e.g. Eddy and Saunders 1980; Chaney et al. 1991; Pauwels et al. 2003; Lee & Chen 2009) and 
what is found are results ranging from no excess returns during a time window associated with 
new product announcements to cumulative excess returns reaching just short of 5%4. Both the 
studies conducted by Chaney et al. (1991) and Lee & Chen (2009) find proof of greater financial 
effects for firms that specialize in more sophisticated technology, such as consumer electronics 
and pharmaceuticals5. 
What previous studies mutually suffer from is old data. The most relevant studies use data from 
different time periods within the second half of the 20th century. Technology has taken huge 
steps ever since. This leap in technology is especially prominent for consumer electronics 
(Christensen et al., 2005). This high level of development, the old data in previous research as 
well as the discovery of a greater financial impact upon new consumer electronic product 
announcements justify the necessity of a deeper understanding of this specific industry, and is 
                                                          
3 See more about the efficient market hypothesis in section 3.2. 
4 See more about these studies in section 2. Previous Research. 
5 See more about these studies in section 2. Previous Research. 
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in essence the motivation for this study. The purpose of this study is to thoroughly investigate 
if any measurable impact on stock prices associated with new consumer electronic product 
announcements still exists, and to quantify any such effects. The analysis will examine effects 
in terms of both returns and risk. 
The main question of this study is as follows: 
Do new product announcements have an impact on stock prices of 
consumer electronic firms? 
Two different types of event studies will be conducted to answer this question as well as four 
later defined hypotheses6. The event studies share a sample of daily stock returns from January 
1st 2009 to April 27th 2015 of 20 different consumer electronic firms, containing a total of 118 
new flagship product announcement events7 occurring between January 5th 2010 and March 
13th 2015. 
The first event study applies the market model to research if excess returns (further referred to 
as abnormal returns) exist for a time window centered on new product announcements, whereas 
the second event study researches changes in idiosyncratic risk centered on the same windows8. 
The second event study, where conditional volatilities are estimated, is conducted in order to 
research if the time window when announcing new consumer electronic products is relatively 
volatile compared to times with no announcements. Since the stock prices may already contain 
expectations about future product announcements, it is possible that when actual specifications 
of new products are published, they do not live up to consumer expectations. This could in turn 
have a negative impact on the stock prices for that particular event. Consequently, if new 
product announcements have an effect on stock prices, both “good” and “bad” announcements 
can be expected to occur. Since risk can never be negative, both abnormal returns and abnormal 
losses would increase the risk, and their effects can never cancel each other out as is the case 
when estimating average abnormal returns, but only add to one another.  
The second event study has a second purpose as well. If positive abnormal returns are found 
during a time associated with new product announcements (which they are, see below) it may 
indicate an anomaly of the efficient market hypothesis. However, if excess risk is located during 
this period, it can also be the case that the excess returns are a compensation for the increased 
                                                          
6 These hypotheses are defined in section 2.3. 
7 See appendix for a list of events used in the study. 
8 See section 5.1 for further explanations of the event study methodology. 
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risk exposure in relation to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). If the risk exposure 
increases in this way, it is required to be compensated for with increased returns, otherwise no 
incentive to take on the extra risk would exist. If this risk is not compensated for, it would be 
an unattractive investment for the risk averse agent. So, any positive abnormal returns found 
may not be abnormal at all, but rather a compensation for a greater risk exposure. 
With above discussion in mind, let’s take a look at the results. The first event study finds proof 
of a positive cumulative average abnormal return when announcing new products in the 
consumer electronic industry. The most significant result is found for the widest event window 
estimated, which consists of 21 days. An average abnormal increase in stock price returns of 
1.569% is estimated for this window. This cumulative abnormal return is significantly different 
from zero at the 0.01 level. A confidence interval which holds the true value to a probability of 
95% is estimated to 1.256% - 1.881%.  
The second event study finds that new product announcements affect the risk level of the firms’ 
stocks on average. The daily increase in risk is greatest with the shortest event window of 3 
days centered on the announcement and diminishes as the size of the event window increases. 
This diminishing trend does not hold for the widest event window of 21 days, when the daily 
risk is higher than that of the 11 day-long event window. The event window to show the greatest 
aggregated average increase in risk is the widest 21 day-long window, indicating that the stock 
prices of the firms examined on average suffer from a more volatile period and that this effect 
continues to last even for the widest event window. Whether the excess risk level, an anomaly 
of the efficient market hypothesis or some other explanation explains the cumulative average 
abnormal returns is difficult to say. However, by studying the components of the dividend 
discount model and having in mind that CAPM only advocates compensation for the systematic 
risk act against the risk compensation theory9.  
1.1 Outline 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 covers necessary limitations of 
this paper. Section 2 contains information about previous research related to this study, 
followed by comments on said research. Section 3 outlines the economic theory. Section 4 
presents the data. Section 5 describes the empirical methodology applied in the study. In section 
6 the results are presented and in section 7 the results are discussed and suggestions of trading 
                                                          
9 See section 3.1 for a more detailed discussion. 
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strategies to exploit found results are presented. Finally, section 8 concludes the study and 
leaves proposals to future research. 
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1.2 Limitations 
1.2.1 Industry limitations 
In order for this study to focus on depth rather than width, some necessary limitations have been 
made. Unlike previous similar research which is covered in section 2, this study focuses on only 
one industry. In the introduction it was mentioned that the consumer electronic industry is of 
particular interest for this kind of analysis, since previous research has found that new product 
announcements have a particularly large impact on market value for firms in this industry. 
Having that said, it is still a limitation to focus on only one industry. Another industry where 
previous research indicates that new product announcements play a large role is in 
pharmaceuticals. For the same reason that justifies this study, a similar study of the 
pharmaceutical industry would be of interest. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the data used in previous studies are decades old. A similar 
study to this one, where the majority of industries are included, but conducted with new data 
would offer valuable information of how the market as a whole reacts to new product 
announcements, as well as the opportunity to compare these effects of today with the effects 
they had in time periods covered by previous studies. Furthermore, it would offer an insight in 
the changes of risk associated with new product announcements that previous studies have 
overlooked. 
Unfortunately, a study of this wide scope on new data would result in a tremendously time-
consuming process of announcement collection. The underlying reason is that no public 
database of recent product announcements could be found. In similar previous research new 
product announcements were collected from the Wall Street Journal Index (which contained all 
product announcements reported by the Wall Street Journal) or from the Frank and Scott index. 
These indices gave researchers of previous studies access to a tool that shortened the data 
collecting process immensely. For unknown reasons, these indices are no longer available. Due 
to time constraints and the lack of such databases, this study focuses on a single, particularly 
announcement-sensitive industry. 
1.2.2 Announcement limitations 
This study does not include every single new product announcement made by the included firms 
during the sample period. This study focuses on flagship products and the reasons are as 
follows: 
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 Flagship products are supposedly more likely to impact stock prices since they are the 
most important product produced by a firm and account for a relatively large part of a 
firm’s revenue compared to minor products (Stevenson, 2010, p. 663). 
 By only focusing on flagship products, the probability of intertwining event windows 
(which causes the issue of covariance between effects from different announcements) is 
reduced. 
 Announcements of flagship products are more likely to be documented. 
 Flagship products are supposedly more expected. This is highly relevant since this study 
researches if expectations have changed the impact of new product announcements 
since similar previous studies. 
Representing the last limitation of this study is the occasional announcement of multiple 
products at the same time. When conducting this study, these announcements have been treated 
as any other announcement.   
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2. Previous research and hypotheses development 
2.1 Previous research 
Chaney, Devinney & Winer (1991) “The Impact of New Product Introductions on 
the Market Value of Firms” 
The authors conducted an event study to test if new product announcements affect stock prices 
by applying the market model on 231 firms listed on either the American Stock Exchange or 
the New York Stock Exchange. The events were product announcements taking place in the 
years 1975 – 1984 collected from the Wall Street Journal Index. The sample included all new 
products announced through the Wall Street Journal with exceptions of automobile firms and 
airlines. 
The authors tested cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on stock prices with four event windows 
of different length: (- 1, t, + 1), (- 3, t, + 3), (- 5, t, + 1) and (- 5, t, + 5) where t is the date of the 
announcement. The CAR of the event windows were compared to an estimation window of 600 
days, ending the day before the first day of the event. 
The authors found that the effect on stock prices was diminishing with an increased length of 
the event window. The widest window of 11 days (- 5, t, + 5) showed no effect, while the 
shortest window of 3 days (- 1, t, + 1), showed a statistically significant average daily excess 
return of 0.25% (p < 0.05). 
Furthermore, the authors found that multiple-product announcements have a significantly 
greater effect on the 3-day excess return (0.93%) than single-product announcements (0.61%). 
A product’s level of originality also impacts excess returns. Original inventions show a 3-day 
excess return of 0.74% versus 0.41% for product updates. 
In order to make the study conducted by Chaney et al. more comparable to this paper for future 
reference, their estimated daily excess returns for the computer industry and the electric 
equipment/appliances industry are presented in the table below. 
 Event Window 
Industry (- 1, t, + 1) (- 3, t, + 3) (- 5, t, + 5) 
Computers    0.22%***   0.14%* 0.03% 
Electronic equipment/appliances    0.31%*** 0.10% 0.07% 
Table 1. Daily returns exported from Chaney et al. (1991). 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level  
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Eddy & Saunders (1980) “New Product Announcements and Stock Prices” 
The authors applied the market model to new product announcements of 66 firms taking place 
in years 1961 – 1969 collected from the Frank and Scott Index. Abnormal returns were 
estimated for an event window of 31 days (- 15, t, + 15) where t is the date of the announcement 
with an estimation window consisting of the 20 months prior and the 20 months after the event 
window. A null hypothesis that new product announcements does not affect stock returns was 
formulated. 
The authors were not able to find any statistically significant CAR during the event window, 
hence the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Based on this result, Eddy & Saunders 
concluded that one cannot successfully design a trading strategy to profit from new product 
announcements. 
Lee & Chen (2009) “The Immediate Impact of New Product Introductions on Stock 
Price: The Role of Firm Resources and Size” 
To research if new product introductions have an immediate impact on stock prices, the authors 
conducted an event study by applying the market model on new product announcement 
collected by the Wall Street Journal Index between years 1990 – 1998. Only announcements 
occurring within three days of unrelated firm events such as mergers and acquisitions or 
changes of chief executive officers were excluded. The sample used contained 409 product 
announcements from 200 different firms. 
A 125-day estimation window beginning six days before the new product announcement was 
used. CAR was estimated for a three day event window containing the day of the event and its 
previous two (- 2, - 1, t) where t is the day of the announcement. 
Lee & Chen found that the day prior the day of the announcement (i.e. t – 1) as well as the day 
of the announcement showed significant abnormal returns. These two days showed abnormal 
returns of 3.96% and 1.02% respectively (p < 0.01). 
Furthermore, the authors confirm the findings of past studies that high-technology firms (such 
as firms specialized in computer and electronics technology, as well as pharmaceuticals) (Reed 
& DeFillippi, 1990) with more sophisticated products tend to have a greater impact on stock 
prices upon new product announcements (Chaney et al., 1991). They find statistically 
significant proof that firms with products of differently sophisticated levels require different 
levels of R&D resources and that the stock price impact caused by invested resources depends 
14 
 
on the level of the investment. Significant R&D investments have a more positive stock price 
impact than moderate investments. 
Pauwels, Silva-Risso, Srinivasan & Hanssens (2003) “The Long-Term Impact of 
New-Product Introductions and Promotions on Financial Performance and Firm 
Value” 
In previous marketing research, researchers have identified key factors for a successful new 
product introduction (Booz et al.,1982; Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1990; Urban and Hauser, 1980). However, this 
research suffers from self-report bias. Furthermore, the research suffers from ambiguity because 
the respondents’ time perspective of a successful launch is subjective (Moorman & Miner, 
1997). The authors conduct a time-series analysis of both short-run and long-run effects on 
financial performance and firm value on six car manufacturers to overcome these defects. 
Pauwels et al. (2003) used data from four sources. Sales transaction data was collected from 
J.D. Power and Associates, containing every new car sales transaction from 1,100 dealerships 
from October 1996 to December 2001. The second source of data was expert opinions by JDPA 
about vehicle updates for the same time period. Firm value data was obtained from the Center 
of Research into Stock Prices database and firm-specific information from Standard and Poor’s 
1999 COMPUSTAT database. 
The authors find that in both short-term and long-term, product introductions increase firm top-
line performance, firm bottom-line performance and firm value. They also find that the impact 
of product introductions on firm value increases over time.  
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2.2 Comments on previous research and hypothesis motivation 
Comparing the results found by Chaney et al. (1991) in their study “The Impact of New Product 
Introductions on the Market Value of Firms” and the results from Lee & Chen (2009) “The 
Immediate Impact of New Product Introductions on Stock Price: The Role of Firm Resources 
and Size” with the results found by Eddy & Saunders (1980) “New Product Announcements on 
Stock Prices”, different results are found to seemingly the same question. However, as Chaney 
et al. (1991) find in their study, the length of the event window has an effect on the results. With 
the trend they find of declining abnormal returns with increased event window length, it is not 
surprising that Eddy & Saunders (1980) with a 31 day-long event window are unable to find 
any statistical proof. Furthermore, neither the sample nor the sample periods are the same, 
explaining divergences in results even further. 
What previous studies mutually suffer from is that none of them are conducted recently. The 
market changes and trends are not constant. As they are found, investors will seek to exploit 
them and as a result they tend to disappear (Byström, 2010, p. 191). At the same time, marketers 
are working hard to reach as many potential customers as possible to maximize sales. New ways 
to reach potential customers are constantly developed and due to the explosion of available 
information, analysts can successfully pinpoint which strategies that are successful. Big launch 
events with extensive media coverage such as the Apple Launch Events are today a reoccurring 
occurrence. With all these forces working in different directions, new estimates of stock price 
impacts associated with new product announcements are of great interest. 
To continue with the Apple example, Apple Launch Events for new products in an existing 
product chain such as the Apple iPhone take place in approximately the same time each year. 
This causes speculations and expectations on the upcoming product before the actual 
announcements, which is hypothesized to have a diminishing effect on the abnormal returns 
should they still exist. The logic is that the product announcement is to some degree expected 
and cannot be assumed to be completely new information. The expected value should already 
be incorporated in the stock price if the efficient market hypothesis holds10.  
Furthermore, for many products (e.g. Apple iPhone) information leakage about product 
specifications prior to the announcement is fairly common. Consequently, not only the product 
to be announced is expected, but its specifications as well. 
                                                          
10 See section 3.2 for a description of the efficient market hypothesis. 
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If the efficient market hypothesis holds, product expectations and product leakage could result 
in a diminished, or possibly even negative impact on stock prices associated with the 
announcement. A negative impact would indicate that the new product announced did not live 
up to consumer and/or investor expectations. 
Much and more has happened since earlier studies, and it is difficult to have overlooked the 
rapid evolution of the consumer electronic industry. To keep the financial research of this 
industry up to date, recent research on the subject is required. Furthermore, since new product 
announcements tend to be expected and prior leakage is not uncommon, it is of interest to 
pinpoint what role these announcements actually play in modern markets. Is the net stock price 
effect of new consumer electronic product announcements still positive? Do some firms 
actually experience a negative impact when announcing new products due to new information 
not living up to expectations? Is the market more “risky” during these events? To answer these 
questions, both the industry as a whole and each firm individually must be analyzed. 
Cooper (1984) and Chaney et al. (1991) confirm the necessity of new products to pursue future 
prosperity of a firm. However, due to a more or less anticipatory market, the effects by 
announcing these new products might be much more complex than one would believe at a first 
glance. To capture this complex dynamic, it may not be enough to only examine abnormal 
returns as in traditional event study methodology. For example, if the net effect of new product 
announcements in the consumer electronic industry is found to be positive, it does not 
automatically mean that this is always the case. By analyzing each firm individually as recently 
mentioned, this may provide information otherwise hidden when the industry is examined as a 
whole. However, incorporating this information to one’s understanding of the market as a whole 
might be difficult. Let’s say that the event study generates following results: on average the 
stock price impact of new product announcements is positive, but some firms are found to react 
negatively when announcing. To understand this dynamic further, a different kind of event 
study is necessary. This is where conditional volatility is introduced. If a risk measure is the 
unit used in an event study, effects both negative and positive would not cancel each other out, 
but add to one another11. 
  
                                                          
11 See more about this in section 5. Empirical Methodology. 
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2.3 Hypotheses formulation 
Based on the discussion above, following hypotheses are formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: New product announcements do not have an impact on stock prices. 
This hypothesis is rejected if cumulative average abnormal returns estimated for one or 
more event windows are found to be significantly different from zero.  
Hypothesis 2: New product announcements impact stock prices of all firms in the same direction. 
This hypothesis is rejected if statistically significant cumulative average abnormal returns 
are found to be both negative and positive for different firms. 
Hypothesis 3: New product announcements do not affect the risk of stock prices. 
This hypothesis is rejected if abnormal conditional volatilities estimated for one or more 
event windows are found to be different from zero. 
Hypothesis 4: The length of the event window does not affect the results. 
This hypothesis is rejected if different significant results are found for different event 
windows. 
Note following:  
 All hypotheses are for the consumer electronic industry. 
 Any impacts found on stock prices are experienced only by the firm or firms examined.  
 Any impacts found occur during event windows of different lengths centered on the 
announcement date. 
 Any patterns found are based on historical data and cannot be guaranteed to remain in the future.  
18 
 
3. Economic theory 
3.1 Dividend discount model 
The discussion in this section is mainly based on Byström (2010). The dividend discount model 
(DDM) is a stock pricing model which states that the price of the stock is equal to the present 
value of all expected future dividends. The expected return of a stock, with which the future 
dividends are discounted, is known as the market discount rate, k. The market discount rate 
consists of the expected dividend, D1, plus the expected stock price value increase, P1 – P0, 
divided by the initial stock price, P0. This is illustrated in equation 1 below. (Byström, 2010, 
pp. 83-86) 
 
𝑘 =
𝐷1 + 𝑃1 − 𝑃0
𝑃0
 (1) 
By rearranging above equation the present value of the stock price is equal to the sum of the 
expected dividend and the expected price at t = 1 discounted with the market discount rate. This 
is illustrated in equation 2 below.  
 
𝑃𝑜 =
𝐷1 + 𝑃1
1 + 𝑘
 (2) 
In order to get the stock price at t = 0, the stock price at t = 1 must be estimated. This is done 
according to equation 3 below. 
 
𝑃0 =
𝐷1 + (
𝐷2 + 𝑃2
1 + 𝑘 )
1 + 𝑘
=
𝐷1
1 + 𝑘
+
𝐷2 + 𝑃2
1 + 𝑘
 
(3) 
If the same process is repeated indefinitely the present value will be equal to all expected future 
dividends discounted with the market discount rate. This relation is presented in equation 4 
below. 
 
𝑃0 =∑
𝐷𝑡
(1 + 𝑘)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
 (4) 
In this paper the purpose of above derivation is not to actually price stocks in practice, but to 
understand the forces affecting the stock price. By studying equation 4 above, one can see that 
if the price of a stock increases it is either the result of an increase in expected future dividends, 
a decrease in the market discount rate, or both. The opposite holds if the stock loses value. So, 
if new product announcements are found to have an impact on stock prices, either the 
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expectations of the future dividends have changed, the market discount rate has changed, or 
both. 
Let’s take a closer look at the market discount rate. One model that can estimate the market 
discount rate is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). CAPM will not be described in detail 
in this paper but some general knowledge is necessary to understand the market discount rate 
(k) and how it may or may not be affected by a new product announcement. CAPM is an 
equilibrium model that in general terms estimates what the risk premium of risky assets would 
be if all investors had the same expectations of risk and returns and designed their portfolios 
optimally through diversification. CAPM introduces the market portfolio as an optimal 
portfolio which contains all risky assets in the world. Below is the equation of the Security 
Market Line (SML) which is how expected returns are estimated according to the CAPM. 
(Byström, 2010, pp. 164-174) 
 𝑘 = 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓) (5) 
𝜇𝑖 is the expected return of asset i, 𝑟𝑓 the risk free interest rate, 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 the expected return of 
the market portfolio and 𝛽𝑖12 is the risk measure defined as following: 
 𝛽𝑖 =
𝜎𝑖,𝑚
𝜎𝑚2
=
𝜌𝑖,𝑚𝜎𝑖
𝜎𝑚
 (6) 
𝜎𝑖,𝑚 is the covariance between asset i and the market portfolio, 𝜎𝑚
2  the variance of the market 
portfolio, 𝜌𝑖,𝑚 the correlation between asset i and the market portfolio, 𝜎𝑖 the volatility of asset 
i and 𝜎𝑚 the volatility of the market portfolio. Study the components of the SML and the 
definition of 𝛽𝑖. A new product announcement does not affect the risk free interest rate or the 
return and risk of the market portfolio. That leaves the numerators in the equalities defining 𝛽𝑖. 
If excess risk associated with new product announcements is found in this study, 𝜎𝑖 is 
temporarily increased. If the volatility of asset i changes yet the volatility of the market portfolio 
is unaffected the covariance or correlation (depending on which equality is used to estimate 𝛽𝑖) 
is likely to decrease. It is not unreasonable to speculate that the increase in volatility of asset i 
and its possible decrease in covariance and correlation with the market portfolio would cancel 
                                                          
12 The β is a risk measure indicating how the returns of a risky asset responds to changes in the market. If β = 1 it 
is indicated that the return of the risky asset will move with the market portfolio. If β < 1 it is indicated that the 
risky asset is less volatile than the market portfolio and if β > 1 it is indicated that the risky asset is more volatile 
than the market portfolio. For example, if a stock’s beta is estimated to 1.3, the stock is estimated to be 30% 
more volatile than the market portfolio. (Byström, 2010, p. 170) 
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each other out and leave 𝛽𝑖 unchanged, thus leaving the market discount rate unchanged. Based 
on this discussion it is unlikely that the market discount rate would be responsible for any 
potential stock price impact associated with a new product announcement. 
More likely to be responsible for any potential stock price impact is the expected future 
dividends. An announcement with a positive stock price reaction would then increase expected 
future dividends and the opposite would hold for an announcement with a negative stock price 
impact. 
3.2 The efficient market hypothesis 
The discussion in this section is mainly based on Fama (1970). The Efficient market hypothesis 
states that the market is said to be efficient, i.e. share prices incorporate all available 
information, thus making it impossible to outperform the overall market. According to the 
efficient market hypothesis, stocks are always traded at their intrinsic value. 
For a market to be efficient a large number of investors who analyze securities for profit are 
assumed, as well as quick price adjustments. According to the article presenting the hypothesis 
by Fama (1970), the market has three different states of efficiency: 
Weak efficiency: 
A market characterized by weak efficiency has all historical information included in the share 
price. Historical data and old news have no impact on share prices and only new information 
impacts future abnormal returns. Technical analysis cannot outperform a weakly efficient 
market. 
Semi-strong efficiency: 
A market characterized by semi-strong efficiency has all historical information as well as new 
public information included in the share price. Semi-strong efficiency makes it impossible to 
outperform the market with fundamental analysis, thus only giving way for investors with 
insider information to predict future abnormal returns. 
Strong efficiency: 
Strong efficiency is the strongest degree of market efficiency. If strong efficiency holds, not 
even a well-informed investor with historical information, new public information as well as 
insider information can successfully predict future stock movements. 
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3.2.1 Level of efficiency on the market 
Whether the market is weakly efficient, semi-strongly efficient or strongly efficient is a well 
disputed question. A modest answer to which most financial professionals would agree is 
quoted below (Byström, 2010, p. 183): 
“Markets are probably weakly efficient and possibly also semi-strongly efficient!” 
3.2.2 Anomaly 
An empirical result which is incompatible with a well-established and generally accepted 
scientific theory is known as an anomaly. If cumulative average abnormal returns are found to 
still exist in this study even though such trends were located decades ago, it could amount for 
an anomaly. The market should have been able to learn that new product announcements 
generate excess returns on average and not have the constant need to readjust stock prices after 
each new announcement. If this is found to not be the case, market inefficiency is a possible 
explanation. (Byström, 2010, p. 190) 
3.3 Random walk 
If a market instantaneously incorporates all available information and stock price changes have 
no “memory” of previous adjustments, as is the case if the efficient market hypothesis holds, 
the changes in stock prices are said to be independent. Since new information is announced 
randomly, the changes in stock prices which are just a reflection of the new information, too 
become random. By definition, a market where changes in stock prices that are independent of 
its historical changes is a random walk market. (Fama, 1965) 
3.4 The standard economic model of consumer behavior  
The Standard Economic Model of Consumer behavior (hereafter referred to as the standard 
model) is an economic model that attempts to explain how individuals make decisions. The 
standard model is both descriptive and normative. A descriptive model is a model which 
describes how people behave and a normative model is a model which describes how people 
should behave to reach a specified objective (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012, p. 4). 
The standard model is centered on rational behavior. Rational behavior is usually explained as 
people using reason when making decisions, rather than basing their decision-making on 
emotion and instinct. However, this definition of rationality is generally assumed too vague and 
economists have designed a well specified framework of rational decision-making. In this 
framework, rationality is defined as individuals having preferences over choices and taking the 
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course of action to reach the most preferred outcome, and by doing so, they are maximizing the 
expected utility. 
To mathematically prove a preferred outcome a utility function is used. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947) proved that for an individual to have a utility function, four axioms must 
be satisfied. These axioms are (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012, p. 68; Mas-Colell et al., 1995, pp. 
167-179): 
Completeness: For all courses of actions individuals can take, the individual has a 
preference ordering. 
Transitivity: The choices of individuals are consistent. If A is preferred to B, and B 
is preferred to C, A is also preferred to C. 
Continuity: Small changes in probability do not change ordering between two 
choices. 
Independence: If two alternative choices are mixed with a third choice, the preference 
ordering of the two mixes does not depend on the third choice. 
With above axioms, one can successfully model decisions under certainty. However, most 
decisions are not certain. For clarity, imagine a gamble with two outcomes; either you win or 
you lose. You don’t know if you will win or lose before participating, hence the decision to 
participate must be done under uncertainty. To help us understand these more complex 
frameworks, we turn to mathematical theories such as expected utility maximization and 
Bayesian probability estimation. 
3.5 Risk-return tradeoff 
In order to fully understand this paper and to avoid jumping to hurried conclusions it is essential 
to understand the risk-return tradeoff. The risk-return tradeoff states that an investor cannot 
maximize his expected return and minimize his risk at the same time (Byström, 2010, p. 141). 
If excess returns associated with new product announcements are found to still exist even 
though this trend was located decades ago, it may be tempting to interpret this result as an 
anomaly and evidence of market inefficiency. However, the full picture is more complex. An 
anomaly is only one possible explanation. A second possible explanation is that any located 
excess return acts as a risk premium for some hidden excess risk associated with this kind of 
event. 
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3.5.1 Risk preferences 
Rational choice under certainty and its axioms have already been covered above. However, to 
purchase, hold and sell stocks are not decisions made under certainty. According to economic 
theory, individuals have different risk preferences which affect their decision making under 
uncertainty. Individuals are generally categorized to either have risk averse preferences, risk 
neutral preferences or risk loving preferences. To simplify the understanding of risk 
preferences, imagine following example. An individual is given the choice to either accept $500 
as a guaranteed payment or participate in a lottery where two outcomes of equal probabilities 
are possible; winning and losing. If the individual chooses the lottery and wins, he or she 
receives $1000. If the individual loses, he or she gets nothing. With the help of elementary 
statistics it is easily calculated that the expected payoff of both scenarios are $50013. (Charness 
et al., 2012) 
Risk averse: 
The risk averse individual prefers to avoid zero-mean risk and would prefer the guaranteed 
payment of $500. A risk averse individual is willing to pay to avoid zero-mean risk (by buying 
insurance for instance). This does not mean that a risk averse individual always prefer the choice 
with the certain outcome. If the expected payoff of the lottery is higher than the guaranteed 
payment, the risk neutral individual may choose to participate in the lottery. How much higher 
the expected payoff must be for the individual to participate is determined by the individual’s 
level of risk aversion. (Eeckhoudt et al., 2004, p. 21) 
Risk neutral: 
The risk neutral individual would be indifferent between accepting the guaranteed payment of 
$500 and to participate in the gamble. A risk neutral individual ranks decisions solely based on 
their expected outcome (Eeckhoudt et al., 2004, p. 19). 
Risk loving: 
A risk loving individual prefers to seek risk and would thereby choose the lottery. A risk loving 
individual would be willing to accept a lottery even if the guaranteed payment was higher than 
the expected payoff of the lottery. How much higher than the expected payoff the guaranteed 
                                                          
13 Expected payoff of scenario 1 = guaranteed sum of $500. Expected payoff of scenario 2 = ($1000+0)/2 = 
$500. 
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payment is allowed to be for an individual to still participate in the lottery indicates the 
individual’s level of risk lovingness. (Eeckhoudt et al., 2004, p. 19) 
In a graph with wealth on the x-axis and the utility of 
wealth on the y-axis, risk averse individuals have 
concave utility functions, risk neutral individuals have 
linear utility functions and risk loving individuals have 
convex utility functions. This is illustrated in Figure 1 to 
the right. (Eeckhoudt et al., 2004, p. 20) 
Most individuals are risk averse. Why it is so is 
explained by evolution. Risk loving individuals seek 
risks and risk can be mortal. By this logic risk loving 
individuals are more inclined to pass away prematurely, 
allowing risk averse individuals to remain alive and pass on their prudent genes (Zhang et al., 
2014). 
Above framework is highly relevant for this study. Replace the lottery with stocks and replace 
the guaranteed payment with a risk free interest rate offered by some bank account with deposit 
insurance. Since the majority of the population is risk averse the expected return of stocks must 
be greater than the return of the risk free bank account for people to be willing to invest their 
money in them. The same goes for different levels of risk, rational risk averse investors are only 
prepared to take on more risk if they are compensated by a higher expected return.  
3.6 Behavioral economics 
Behavioral economics is a supplementary model to the standard model. Behavioral economics 
introduces psychology to economics in order to understand economic decisions which allows 
for a high level of accuracy at the expense of a wide scope as offered by the standard model. 
The standard model pays no mind to behavioral economics because it argues that non-standard 
behavior will be eliminated when examining the market as a whole (Croson & Gächter, 2009). 
Nevertheless, behavioral economics is a growing field which takes the standpoint that people 
do not always act rational. Individuals adopt beliefs and heuristics (rules of thumb) and suffer 
from biases when making decisions, causing the decisions to be irrational but more cognitively 
manageable (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012, p. 117). By discovering these inconsistencies, irrational 
behavior can actually be predictable as Dan Ariely explains in his book Predictably Irrational 
(2008). 
Figure 1. Utility functions of individuals with 
different risk preferences. 
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Behavioral economics offers an alternative explanation to why the market sometimes acts as it 
does. For example, behavioral economics suggests that the equity premium puzzle14 may be 
explained by myopic loss aversion, suggesting the frequency with which investors close their 
accounts and resetting their reference point15 affects their risk attitude. Losses are heavier felt 
than gains of the same size, and if an investor keeps a daily track of his or her risky assets and 
resets the reference point on a daily basis, close to 50% of the daily closing prices will be losses. 
The stock investment may then feel like a bad investment unless the equity premium is high 
enough. (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012, pp. 160-168) 
In a first step to adopt behavioral economics to this study, imagine the launch events mentioned 
in the introduction which firms often host when announcing new products. These events, as 
well as the actual product, are part of a firm’s marketing strategy. The more people the 
announcement reaches, the greater pool of potential customers. Launch events often attract the 
attention of media. 
Research indicates that media may play a greater role than one would expect after having 
studied the efficient market hypothesis. Engelberg and Parsons (2011, p. 29) find that “the 
presence or absence of local media coverage is strongly related to the magnitude of the local 
trading”. Imagine following example. EntreMed (ENMD) is a biotechnology firm. Figure 2 
shows the adjusted closing stock prices of the firm ranging from October 1st 1997 to the end of 
1998. 
 
Figure 2. EntreMed ajusted closing prices October 1st 1997 to end of 1998. 
                                                          
14 The equity premium puzzle is the phenomenon that stocks generate much higher returns than the risk free rate 
(an average yearly difference of approximately 6% over the latest 80 years) which indicates a level of risk 
aversion inconsistent with economic research (Mehra & Prescott, 1985). 
15 The reference point is experienced as a zero point for an individual. Deviations from the reference point are 
experienced as gains or losses (Wilingson & Klaes, 2012, p. 164). 
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A small spike occurs at November 28th 1997. At this date a scientific paper was published 
stating a breakthrough in cancer research. EntreMed had licensing rights to this breakthrough, 
thus experiencing a (temporary) impact on its stock prices. At May 4th 1998, the New York 
Times reports about this breakthrough and mentions EntreMed, causing a huge spike in the 
firm’s stock prices. Initially, the stock price falls after the impact, indicating a temporary 
overvaluation of the stock. However, even after the stock price has adjusted from this 
overreaction, some of the impact remains. The stock price is still more than twice the stock 
price before the New York Times article. Even at November 12th 1998, when the New York 
Times publishes a new article, on its front page no less, about how other laboratories fail to 
replicate the result in the original November 28 paper, the stock price of EntreMed remains 
twice as high as it was on May 1st. (Huberman & Regev, 2001) 
The important role media plays is visualized by above example. It even has the power to 
permanently impact a supposedly efficient market with old news. The permanent stock price 
impact experienced by EntreMed despite failed attempts to replicate the results by other 
laboratories can possibly be explained by a cognitive bias known as anchoring. Anchoring is a 
cognitive bias where the decision of an individual tend to rely too heavily on the first 
information received. In the EntreMed example, the anchor is the stock price at the top of the 
huge spike at May 4th 1998 and may act as a reference point for future stock prices. With a high 
reference point, stock prices will show resistance to adjust to old levels since losses are, 
according to prospect theory, felt more heavily than gains for loss averse individuals. 
(Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012, p. 167) 
Based on above discussion about the role of media, any differences in results between event 
windows of different sizes centered on new product announcements found in this study may be 
explained by the reception of media. Since this reception may not be published immediately 
after the announcement and because investors may need time to assimilate it, the role media 
plays on the stock price impact may be prolonged. In order to capture this effect event windows 
of different lengths are examined.  
Behavioral economics may also explain possible negative stock price impacts associated with 
new product announcements. Previously, it has been argued that any such effects may occur if 
the product does not live up to expectations. In this case, the expectations of the product in 
people’s minds act as a reference point, and any losses in utility due to for example 
disappointing specifications, design or price will reflect negatively on the stock price.  
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3.7 Options 
In this paper trading strategies involving options will be suggested in section 7 in order to 
exploit any changes in idiosyncratic risk the empirical study finds. The trading strategies of 
interest are the butterfly spread and the three combinations described below. These are 
strategies that increase in value when the volatility of the underlying asset changes. 
An option is a contract which gives the holder the right to either buy the underlying asset (if a 
call option) or sell the underlying asset (if a put option) at a certain date (the expiration date) 
for a certain price (the strike price). The agent buying the contract is said to go long on the 
contract while the seller goes short. Two types of options are American and European options. 
The difference between the two is that the American option can be exercised at any time up to 
the expiration date while the European option can only be exercised at the expiration date. (Hull, 
2011, p. 7) 
3.7.1 Butterfly spread 
A butterfly spread consists of three European option positions with different strike prices (K1, 
K2 and K3, where K2 is generally close to the current stock price, S0) and the same underlying 
asset. The butterfly spread is most valuable when the underlying asset is the same at the 
expiration date as it was when the contract was signed, and is worth less the more the price of 
the underlying asset deviates from this value. The trading strategy is appropriate when a 
speculator expects a period of low volatility and the price of the underlying asset to remain at 
about the same level as when the trading strategy was created. Figure 3 below is an illustration 
of the profit from a butterfly spread using put options. (Hull, 2011, p. 242) 
 
Figure 3. Profit from a butterfly spread using put options. 
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3.7.2 Combinations 
Trading strategies consisting of positions in both calls and puts on the same underlying asset 
are known as combinations. In this paper straddles, strips and straps are described. The more 
the price of the underlying asset deviates from the price when the trading strategies were 
created, the more valuable are the strategies. Intuitively, these strategies increase in value if the 
volatility increases. In technical terms these strategies have high vegas16, i.e. having a high 
sensitivity to volatility. (Hull, 2011, p. 246)  
3.7.2.1 Straddle 
The straddle consists of a long position in one European call and one long position in a 
European put with the same strike price (K) and expiration date. The straddle is appropriate 
when a speculator expects a large price movement in the underlying asset but has no opinion 
about the direction. Figure 4 below is an illustration of the profit from a straddle. (Hull, 2011, 
p. 246) 
 
Figure 4. Profit from a straddle. 
3.7.2.2 Strip 
The strip consists of a long position in one European call and two long positions in European 
puts with the same strike price (K) and expiration date. The strip is appropriate when a 
speculator expects a large price movement in the underlying asset and expects the probability 
of a decrease in price to be higher than an increase. Figure 5 below is an illustration of the profit 
from a strip. (Hull, 2011, p. 247) 
                                                          
16 Mathematically vega is the derivative of the option value with respect to the volatility of the underlying asset. 
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Figure 5. Profit from a strip. 
3.7.2.3 Strap 
The strap consists of two long positions in European calls and a long position in one European 
put with the same strike price (K) and expiration date. The strap is appropriate when a speculator 
expects a large price movement in the underlying asset and expects the probability of an 
increase in price to be higher than a decrease. Figure 6 below is an illustration of the profit from 
a strap. (Hull, 2011, p. 247) 
 
Figure 6. Profit from a strap. 
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4. Data 
The data collecting process has been twofold. First, major product announcements from 20 of 
the largest publicly traded consumer electronic firms have been collected. The announcements 
have been collected from press conferences made by respective firm, press releases and news 
articles. Major products are in this paper defined as flagship products and are in most cases 
announced one to two times a year. All product announcements took place after the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 with the intention to produce results relevant for today’s 
economy17. The complete series of announcements used in the empirical analysis consists of 
118 announcements made by 20 firms. Canon and Nikon (both consumer electronic firms 
specializing in cameras) tend to launch series of products at one day each year. Several of the 
firms in the sample tend to announce new products on trade shows such as the Consumer 
Electronics Show (CES) taking place in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA in January each year, and the 
Internationale Funkausstellung Berlin (IFA) taking place in Berlin, Germany in August or 
September each year. 
The definition of a flagship product may be argued to be somewhat ambiguous which could be 
perceived as a problem with the data. In the most relevant previous studies data sets consisting 
of news articles about new product announcement posted in The Wall Street Journal have been 
used. Only product announcements defined as “major announcements” are part of the data sets. 
These studies define a “major announcement” as an announcement published by The Wall 
Street Journal in a news article. Which announcements to be published are decided by 
individuals such as reporters and editors of The Wall Street Journal. Previous research could 
thereby also be argued to suffer from ambiguity. This potential issue is difficult to evade and 
the only way to do so would be to include all product announcements made by firms included 
in the study for a predetermined period. This would result in a problematic data collection 
process due to deficient documentation of minor product innovations. Furthermore, a data set 
of this structure would suffer from reduced empirical findings due to the presumed weaker stock 
price impact of minor product announcements. 
An issue similar to the one described above is ambiguity when choosing firms for the study. A 
solution much like the one stated above would be required to solve this problem, namely to 
include all public firms for a chosen industry. To follow this design would result in an immense 
data collecting process. 
                                                          
17 See appendix for list of firms and announcements. 
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The second part of the data collecting process was to collect daily data of adjusted closing stock 
prices for each of the 20 firms as well as the market index for respective stock exchange where 
each firm is traded. The sample period starts at January 1st 2009 and ends at April 27th 2015 and 
contains a total of 118 new flagship product announcement events occurring between January 
5th 2010 and March 13th 201518. Data from 2009 is solely used for estimation purposes and 
thereby contains no events. 
Thomson Reuters Datastream was used to collect the data. From the daily changes in stock and 
index prices log returns were calculated. The log returns were used for the estimation of 
abnormal returns. 
  
                                                          
18 See appendix for the stock exchanges each firm is traded on and the stock exchanges’ respective market 
indices. 
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5. Empirical methodology 
5.1 Event study 
The discussion in this section is mainly based on MacKinlay (1997). The event study 
methodology is primarily used to locate estimated effects on stock prices occurring as a result 
of new information. 
In this study, two different event studies will be conducted. The first event study will research 
if abnormal returns centered on the announcement of new consumer electronic products exist. 
The new product announcement is the event of interest. The second event study will research if 
any change in conditional volatilities occur with the release of this new information. In other 
words, the second event study will attempt to capture effects of changes in risk associated with 
new product announcements on the consumer electronic market. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 above illustrates the event window timeline. The event study divides a time period of 
interest into two sections. The first section is the estimation window which is a time period 
usually occurring before the even. In this paper the estimation window is 1 year, or 252 trading 
days. The estimation window is followed by the much shorter event window which includes the 
event day (the day when the event occurs). The estimation window is used to estimate normal 
returns or expected returns for the event window, i.e. returns that were to be expected if no 
major events were to take place. During the event window actual returns generated by the stock 
market are collected. The difference between the actual returns and the estimated normal returns 
are called abnormal returns. If abnormal returns are found, they are assumed to be a response 
to the new information.  
In order to capture how long the financial effects (if any) of new consumer electronic product 
announcements last, five event windows of different lengths are analyzed. The lengths of the 
event windows and their location relative to the event day (t) are illustrated in Table 2 below. 
  
Estimation window Event window 
Event day 
Figure 7. Illustration of the event study timeline. 
33 
 
 
Length of event window Location of event window relative to event day (t) 
3 days (- 1, t, + 1) 
5 days (- 2, t, + 2) 
7 days (- 3, t, + 3) 
11 days (- 5, t, + 5) 
21 days (- 10, t, + 10) 
Table 2. Illustration of the event windows used in the study. 
5.1.1 Abnormal returns 
As described above, when conducting event studies abnormal returns are key. The idea is that 
the estimated abnormal returns are the financial effect of the event in question. To locate such 
effects contributes with valuable information for firms and investors and facilitates their 
decision making. With this knowledge, firms and investors have some idea of what kind of 
effect to expect on firm market value due to the release of new firm specific information in the 
future. This information can be used for speculative purposes as well as for risk managing. Take 
the study in this paper as example: by locating expected changes in firm market value associated 
with the announcement of new consumer electronic products, speculators can get a hint of what 
the expected economic impact on the stock price may be upon the release of similar information 
in the future. With this knowledge they can attempt to exploit this abnormal return with different 
trading strategies. 
To generate the abnormal returns, actual returns must be calculated with stock price information 
generated from the stock market and normal/expected returns must be estimated. The actual 
return is the log return and is calculated according to equation 7 below. 
 
𝑟𝑡 = ln⁡(
𝑆𝑡
𝑆𝑡−1
) (7) 
where rt is the log return of the stock at time t, St is the stock price at time t and St-1 is the stock 
price at time t-1. 
The expected return can be estimated using different methods. However, the most commonly 
used method is the market model. The market model is an example of a one factor model. More 
advanced multifactor models exist, however the gains from applying such models for event 
studies are in general small. This is explained by the empirical fact that the marginal explanatory 
power of additional factors are small. Due to the redundancy of more advanced models, the 
market model is chosen for this study. 
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The market model assumes a linear relation between a firm’s stock returns and the market index. 
A linear regression with the market index as the explanatory variable and the firm’s stock price 
as the dependable variable is run on the sample. The parameters α (the intercept) and β19 (the 
risk exposure to general market movements) are estimated by following linear regression.  
 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡) = ⁡𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (8) 
Rmt is the log return of the market index at time t and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
The abnormal return for a specific day is estimated by taking the actual return of this day 
subtracted by the estimated normal/expected return for the same day. This is illustrated in 
equation (9) below. 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡) (9) 
In the next step average abnormal returns (AARs) are calculated for each day of the event 
windows. The AARs are the average daily abnormal returns of all events included in the study. 
The AAR of the event day would for example be the average of all abnormal returns for that 
day over all events included in the study. Note that in this study, AARs are estimated for each 
firm represented in the study as well as for the industry as a whole. The AARs are calculated 
according to equation 10 below. Note that the “A” representing “average” is in the equation 
represented by a bar above the abnormal return.  
 
𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
 (10) 
In order to draw conclusions of the financial impact of the event, the AARs must be aggregated 
over the event window. This is done by calculating the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) according to equation 11 below. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 (11) 
Finally, the test statistic to test if the null hypothesis of CAAR = 0 is calculated according to 
equation 12. A p-value is then generated from the critical value to display significance level. 
 
𝜃 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2))
1
2
~⁡𝑁(0,1) (12) 
                                                          
19 The β is the same risk measure as defined in section 3.1. 
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5.2 Variance and standard deviation 
Two risk measures of particular importance for this study are the variance and the volatility. 
The volatility is also known as the standard deviation.  
Variance is a measure of risk that quantifies how far numbers of a population is spread out. If 
the numbers are identical the variance is zero. Due to its mathematical definition, the variance 
can never be negative. Mathematically it is defined as the expected value of the square of the 
difference between the random variable X and the population mean μx. 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑋) = 𝜎𝑋
2 = 𝐸{(𝑋 − 𝜇𝑋)
2} (13) 
The square root of the variance is called volatility or standard deviation and has the same 
dimension as the data. (Dougherty, 2011, p. 11) 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑⁡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑆𝐷) = 𝜎𝑋 = √𝜎𝑋
2 (14) 
5.3 Conditional variance 
Imagine a random variable 𝑦𝑡 whose value depends on past information. The random value 𝑦𝑡  
could for example be drawn from the density function 𝑓(𝑦𝑡|𝑦𝑡−1), meaning that the value of 𝑦𝑡 
depends on the value of the conditioning variable 𝑦 at time t-1. The expected value at 𝑦𝑡 is 
given by 𝐸(𝑦𝑡|𝑦𝑡−1) and the variance of this forecast is given by 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑡|𝑦𝑡−1). This expression 
recognizes that the conditional variance depends on past information, hence may be a random 
variable. (Engle, 1982) 
Conventional time series and econometric models assume that the variance is constant. 
Bollerslev (1986) proposes the GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity) process to model conditional variances. In the GARCH process the 
conditional variance depends on past values of the squared errors and on past conditional 
variances. This process generates conditional variances which are allowed to change over time, 
a method most commonly used to capture so called volatility clustering20. The square root of 
the conditional variance generates the conditional volatility. 
5.4 Probability distribution 
When applying econometrics to financial data, a common assumption is that the returns are 
conditionally normally distributed. However, Bollerslev (1987) finds evidence of conditional 
                                                          
20 A period in time when volatility is relatively high. 
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leptokurtosis21 when analyzing the S&P 500 Composite Index returns. Estimates generated with 
the use of the normal distribution are still consistent, but may not be efficient. In response of 
this issue, scientists usually select one of two methods.  
1. They use the normal distribution and accept that the estimates may not be efficient. 
2. They use some other distribution with leptokurtosis properties, such as the Student’s t-
distribution. 
Since the leptokurtic property of financial data is a widely known phenomena, using the 
Student’s t-distribution is a common solution. However, if the Student’s t-distribution is used 
erroneously (meaning that the t-distribution is not the true distribution of the sample), the 
estimates are no longer consistent. Furthermore, with a large sample of observations, the 
Student’s t-distribution converges to the normal distribution (Dougherty, 2011, p. 50). In this 
study, one of the objectives is to examine possible changes in risk when consumer electronic 
firms announce new products by estimating conditional volatilities using GARCH. Since the 
sample used in this study is considered large and inconsistent estimates are unwanted, the 
normal distribution is used in the process of generating conditional volatilities. 
5.5 Estimation of conditional volatilities 
What the CAAR represents is the firm specific abnormal returns corrected for market 
movements with the market model. For this reason it is the firm specific risk (i.e. idiosyncratic 
risk) that is of interest in the second event study. Conditional variances of the abnormal returns 
were generated with the GARCH process below (Bollerslev, 1986). 
 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 + γ𝐼{𝑡𝜖𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤} (14) 
where 𝜔 is the intercept. 𝛼 is the parameter describing the impact of 𝜀𝑡−1
2 , which is the squared 
error of the day before. 𝛽 is the parameter describing the impact of the conditional variance 
from the day before.⁡𝐼{𝑡𝜖𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤} is a dummy variable which is 0 for the estimation window and 
1 for the event window. γ is the differential intercept coefficient representing the increase or 
decrease in the intercept of the conditional variance on a daily basis during the event window. 
If 𝛾 ≠ 0 for a firm, the firm encounters a change in risk on average when announcing new 
consumer electronic products.  
                                                          
21 A distribution with leptokurtosis properties has positive excess kurtosis and is characterized by fatter tails and 
is more clustered around the mean (Verbeek, 2004, p. 400). 
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The conditional variances for each firm and for each event window presented in Table 2 were 
estimated in EViews and then converted to conditional volatilities by taking the square root of 
them.  
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6. Empirical results 
In this section the empirical results will be presented and organized as follows. Presented first 
are the results from the event study where CAARs and AARs were estimated. These results 
account for the consumer electronic industry as a whole. In the second section the results of 
CAARs for each firm included in the study are presented. In the third section industry specific 
results from the second event study where conditional volatilities were estimated are presented. 
In the fourth section firm specific results from the second event study are presented. In the fifth 
section the results are presented in relation to the hypotheses. 
6.1 Cumulative average abnormal return – industry specific results 
The results generated by the cross-sectional event study are presented in Table 3 below. 
Event window CAAR  p-value 
(- 1, t, + 1) 0.024%  0.8793 
(- 2, t, + 2) 0.522% *** 0.0011 
(- 3, t, + 3) 0.062%  0.6990 
(- 5, t, + 5) 0.577% *** 0.0003 
(- 10, t, + 10) 1.569% *** 0.0000 
Table 3 CAARs – industry specific. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level  
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
In Table 3 the CAARs estimated for the different event windows are presented. These CAARs 
are the average change in excess returns during the event windows over all firms included in 
the study. 
The CAARs are followed by respective test statistic and the p-values represent the probability 
that the null hypothesis is rejected when actually true (Thisted, 1998). Remember that the null 
hypothesis in this test is: H0: CAAR = 0. The significance level is illustrated by asterisks 
following the CAARs. As can be seen in Table 3, the event windows (- 2, t, + 2), (- 5, t, + 5) 
and (- 10, t, + 10) generated statistically significant results. These results are all significant at 
the 0.01 level and conclude that the historical CAARs for the firms included in the study are on 
average different from zero. Since the CAARs are positive, it is concluded that the new product 
announcements historically on average have a positive impact on stock prices. 
In Table 4 below, confidence intervals for the statistically significant CAARs are presented. 
The confidence intervals hold the true value of the CAARs to a probability of 95%. 
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Event window Confidence interval for CAAR 
(- 2, t, + 2) 0.210%⁡ < ?̅? ⁡< 0.835% 
(- 5, t, + 5) 0.264%⁡ < ?̅? ⁡< 0.978% 
(- 10, t, + 10) 1.256%⁡ < ?̅? ⁡< 1.881% 
Table 4. Confidence intervals containing true CAAR to 95%.probability for event windows with significant results.  
 
Figure 8. CAAR over 21 day event window centered on event day. 
In Figure 8 the CAAR for the 21 day-long event window for the 
consumer electronics industry, concluded to be significant at the 
0.01 level, is presented. Any pattern in the graph should be 
analyzed with care since a majority of the movements in the CAAR 
curve are not significantly different from zero. 
Notable is the steep increase in CAAR occurring two trading days after the event. In Table 5 
the AARs for each day in the event window are presented. The AAR responsible for the steep 
increase in CAAR is in Table 5 found to be estimated to 0.593% and is significant at the 0.01 
level. This result indicates that an AAR of a size larger than one third of the event window’s 
total CAAR have occurred in a single day. 
Just as interesting are the three other trading days that represent statistically significant results 
(see asterisks in Table 5). On the trading day after the announcement and the trading day three 
days after, negative AARs are estimated. Based on the statistically significant results of both 
positive and negative nature found for the three days following the announcement, the market 
Table 5. AARs. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level  
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
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seems to appear more volatile during this time period. This effect should be remembered for 
the second event study where conditional volatilities are estimated. 
According to table 5 the last statistically significant result is found on the ninth day after the 
announcement. An increase in AAR of 0.331% is estimated for this day, significant at the 0.05 
level. 
6.2 Cumulative abnormal returns – firm specific results 
In Table 6 below, estimated CAARs are presented for each firm included in the study and for 
each event window analyzed. The CAARs are followed by their test statistic as well as the p-
value for significance information. 
ACER, AMD, HTC, MSI and Nikon experience CAARs of over 5%, indicating a relatively 
large positive stock price impact associated with new product announcements for these firms. 
Each of these firms experience the greatest stock price impact over the two widest event 
windows. In fact, there is a clear trend that the wider event windows hold the most distinct 
results. For all firms (where the percentages are statistically significant) except Amazon, 
Google and Nintendo, the percentages farthest away from zero are found in either the (- 5, t, + 
5) window or in the (- 10, t, + 10) window. Nintendo is the only firm to show the largest impact 
over the shortest event window. This trend is opposite to the trend found by Chaney et al. 
(1991), where CAARs were diminishing with an increase in event window length. 
Table 6 shows that there are some firms experiencing statistically significant cumulative 
abnormal losses during the windows examined. Firms to show such effects are Amazon, Apple, 
Asus, Canon, Google, HP and Panasonic. Conclusively, 7 out of 18 firms with significant 
results show proof of this effect. 
Lenovo and Microsoft are the only firms who do not reject the null hypothesis of CAAR = 0 in 
any of the five event windows at any of the three significance levels. This indicates that the 
study does not find any proof that new product announcements have any impact on Lenovo’s 
and Microsoft’s stock prices. 
Apple is the only firm that experiences both significant excess returns and excess losses in 
different event windows. The widest event window is the only event window with excess 
returns. This indicates that the positive stock price effects associated with new product 
announcement occur relatively far away from the announcement day for Apple. 
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 Event Window 
 (- 1, t, + 1) (- 2, t, + 2) (- 3, t, + 3) (- 5, t, + 5) (- 10, t, + 10) 
Firm CAAR z-stat p-value CAAR z-stat p-value CAAR z-stat p-value CAAR z-stat p-value CAAR z-stat p-value 
Acer 2.833% 3.52 0.0004*** 3.258% 4.05 0.0001*** 2.568% 3.19 0.0014*** 6.532% 8.11 0.0000*** 4.055% 5.04 0.0000*** 
Amazon -1.291% -2.01 0.0445** -1.917% -2.98 0.0029*** -1.234% -1.92 0.0548* -1.460% -2.27 0.0231** 0.336% 0.5226 0.6013 
AMD -0.873% -0.94 0.3469 0.822% 0.89 0.3756 -0.778% -0.84 0.4018 3.201% 3.45 0.0006*** 5.332% 5.75 0.0000*** 
Apple -0.627% -1.05 0.2938 -1.211% -2.03 0.0427** -2.428% -4.06 0.0000*** -2.664% -4.46 0.0000*** 1.935% 3.24 0.0012*** 
ASUS -0.095% -0.16 0.8726 0.587% 0.99 0.3206 0.513% 0.87 0.3853 -0.412% -0.70 0.4856 -1.281% -2.17 0.0303** 
Canon -0.120% -0.18 0.8547 -0.991% -1.51 0.1312 -1.675% -2.5523 0.0107** -0.020% -0.03 0.9754 -1.732% -2.64 0.0083*** 
Google -0.974% -1.9894 0.0467** -2.094% -4.28 0.0000*** -1.745% -3.56 0.0004*** -1.640% -3.35 0.0008*** -0.424% -0.87 0.3865 
HP 0.071% 0.10 0.9168 -0.158% -0.23 0.8168 -0.789% -1.16 0.2471 -1.108% -1.62 0.1044 -3.056% -4.48 0.0000*** 
HTC 1.421% 1.31 0.1901 3.116% 2.87 0.0041*** 3.504% 3.23 0.0012*** 4.345% 4.01 0.0001*** 6.096% 5.62 0.0000*** 
Intel 0.079% 0.15 0.8824 1.086% 2.04 0.0414** 0.140% 0.26 0.7925 1.566% 2.94 0.0033*** 4.336% 8.14 0.0000*** 
Lenovo 0.416% 0.62 0.5375 0.550% 0.81 0.4153 -0.368% -0.54 0.5861 -0.539% -0.80 0.4246 -0.544% -0.81 0.4208 
LG -0.799% -1.23 0.2191 0.861% 1.32 0.1853 0.075% 0.11 0.9085 1.287% 1.98 0.0476** 0.614% 0.94 0.3451 
Microsoft -0.173% -0.34 0.7318 0.088% 0.17 0.8619 0.139% 0.27 0.7837 -0.646% -1.28 0.2010 0.240% 0.48 0.6347 
MSI 1.212% 1.73 0.0834* 4.389% 6.27 0.0000*** 1.947% 2.78 0.0054*** 2.434% 3.48 0.0005*** 5.568% 7.95 0.0000*** 
Nikon -1.176% -1.63 0.1034 1.425% 1.97 0.0484** 1.524% 2.11 0.0348** 3.978% 5.51 0.0000*** 5.673% 7.86 0.0000*** 
Nintendo 1.703% 1.71 0.0864* 1.157% 1.17 0.2440 -0.170% -0.17 0.8643 1.194% 1.20 0.2291 0.070% 0.07 0.9437 
NVidia 0.740% 1.24 0.2164 2.046% 3.42 0.0006*** 1.955% 3.27 0.0011*** 2.391% 4.00 0.0001*** 2.912% 4.87 0.0000*** 
Panasonic 0.676% 1.08 0.2780 -0.033% -0.05 0.9578 0.505% 0.81 0.4177 -1.042% -1.67 0.0945* 0.995% 1.60 0.1103 
Samsung 0.617% 1.26 0.2088 1.042% 2.12 0.0340** 0.462% 0.94 0.3474 0.899% 1.83 0.0671* 3.472% 7.07 0.0000*** 
Sony 0.218% 0.30 0.7665 -0.494% -0.67 0.5021 0.248% 0.34 0.7357 -0.982% -1.33 0.1819 2.454% 3.34 0.0009*** 
Table 6. CAARs – firm specific. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level  
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level
42 
 
6.3 Cumulative abnormal risk – industry specific results 
In this section changes in idiosyncratic risk during the event windows of different lengths are 
presented. The risk measure used is conditional volatility, allowing the dimensions of the risk 
to be the same as the data. The abnormal volatilities for the event windows presented in Table 
7 below are aggregated over the length of each event window. For example, conditional 
volatilities estimated for the 3 day-long event window (- 1, t, + 1) is the average one-day 
volatility multiplied by 3. 
Event window Abnormal 
𝝈𝒕̅̅ ̅ 
 𝝈𝒕,𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ % increase  
(- 1, t, + 1) 0.0068  0.0494 13,765%  
(- 2, t, + 2) 0.0071  0.0832 8.564%  
(- 3, t, + 3) 0.0066  0.1164 5.670%  
(- 5, t, + 5) 0.0062  0.1837 3.375%  
(- 10, t, + 10) 0.0171  0.3466 4.934%  
Table 7. Cumulative abnormal risk and normal/expected risk – industry specific 
Table 7 should be read as follows: the values under “Abnormal 𝝈𝒕̅̅ ̅” are the cumulative 
abnormal conditional volatilities (the cumulative abnormal idiosyncratic risk) the consumer 
electronic industry has experienced during the event windows. In other words, it is the 
differential intercept coefficient estimated with the dummy variable multiplied by the length of 
respective event window. The values under “𝝈𝒕,𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅” are the average idiosyncratic risk for 
the estimation window multiplied by the length of the event window. Percentages under “% 
increase” are the increase in average conditional volatility during a day in the event window 
compared to the average conditional volatility of the estimation window. 
The daily conditional volatilities are aggregated over the event windows to facilitate the 
comparison between event windows of different lengths in a similar manner as done with the 
CAARs before. 
The 4 shorter event windows show about the same level of cumulative abnormal risk. The 
cumulative abnormal risk estimated for the event window (- 10, t, + 10) of 21 days stands out 
from the other 4 windows with a higher value. This result indicates a persistent increase in 
abnormal risk associated with new product announcements that lasts for the longest period 
estimated.  
According to the “% increase” column in Table 7, the increase in daily risk is found to be 
greatest in the shortest event window, indicating a particularly volatile period close to the new 
product announcement. A diminishing increase in risk as the length of the event window 
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increases exists for four of the five event windows, a trend broken by the widest window. An 
increase in conditional volatility is found for all event windows. This result concludes that new 
product announcements are associated with increased risk and this risk is present in all event 
windows examined. 
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6.4 Cumulative abnormal risk – firm specific results 
In Table 8 below, the firm specific results of the second event study are presented. The table 
contains estimated information for each of the 20 firms included in the study for each of the 
five event windows of different lengths. Below follows an explanation of how the table should 
be interpreted. 
The coefficient named “γ” is the average aggregated increase or decrease (depending on the 
sign in front) in conditional volatility for all days in the event windows. This column represents 
the cumulative abnormal idiosyncratic risk for each firm and displays the differential intercept 
coefficients estimated with each dummy variable for the different event windows included in 
the study multiplied by the length of the event window. For example, consider the first 
estimated coefficient under γ in the table. Here, the average increase (since the number is 
positive) in conditional volatility for Acer is 0.007791. This coefficient is for the 3 day-long 
event window (- 1, t, + 1). The p-value is for the daily differential intercept coefficient and is 
estimated to 0.0002 which declares it significant at the 0.01 level. Based on the sign of the 
coefficient and the significance level, it is concluded that Acer historically, on average, has 
experienced increased idiosyncratic risk over this time window when announcing new products. 
Next, consider the last coefficient for Sony under γ in the table found at the bottom of the 21 
day-long event window (- 10, t, + 10). The value of this coefficient is -0.05431. A negative 
value states that Sony historically, on average, has experienced a decrease in idiosyncratic risk 
over a time window of 21 days centered on a new product announcement. 
The column following γ has the header “%” and serves with the purpose to increase the 
understanding of the differential intercept coefficient. What the percentages in this column 
states are the increase or decrease in conditional volatilities during a day in the event windows 
compared to the average idiosyncratic risk for the estimation window. Again, consider the result 
found for Acer over the three day event window. This should be interpreted as following: Acer 
experiences an average increase in conditional volatility of 14.85% over this event window 
when announcing new products.  
HTC and NVidia are the only firms not to show any results significant from zero and the null 
hypothesis that new product announcement have no impact on a firm’s stock price risk cannot 
be rejected for these firms. 
Remaining 18 firms showed statistically significant proof of changes in risk different from zero 
when announcing new products at some of the three significance levels for one or more event 
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window. These changes in risk were found in both directions and the hypothesized effect that 
new product announcements would temporarily impact the idiosyncratic risk of stock prices 
was confirmed for these firms. 
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 Event Window 
 (- 1, t, + 1) (- 2, t, + 2) (- 3, t, + 3) (- 5, t, + 5) (- 10, t, + 10) 
Firm γ3 % p-value γ5 % p-value γ7 % p-value γ11 % p-value γ21 % p-value 
Acer 0.0077909 14.851% 0.0002*** 0.008940 10.230% 0.0002*** 0.0104658 8.560% 0.0002*** 0.0118598 6.175% 0.0002*** 0.0129926 3.539% 0.0017*** 
Amazon 0.0373733 75.860% 0.0008*** 0.032138 39.004% 0.0002*** 0.0227703 19.642% 0.0062*** 0.0061488 3.348% 0.6603 -0.0085361 -2.413% 0.0016*** 
AMD 0.0003187 0.408% 0.3421 0.000060 0.046% 0.0955* 0.002396 1.310% 0.1423 0.0102475 3.558% 0.4043 0.0179116 3.250% 0.1252 
Apple 0.0089808 23.255% 0.0634* 0.009586 14.908% 0.0830* 0.009653 10.733% 0.1174 0.0188547 13.397% 0.0114** 0.0566792 21.130% 0.0046*** 
ASUS 0.0006303 1.195% 0.0524** 0.002486 2.823% 0.0519** 0.0066095 5.355% 0.4656 0.0089205 4.583% 0.1350 0.0108692 2.884% 0.0005*** 
Canon 0.0021206 5.727% 0.0751* 0.002873 4.655% 0.0608* 0.0036213 4.190% 0.0507* 0.004989 3.672% 0.0477** 0.0081095 3.124% 0.1370 
Google -0.0062727 -18.044% 0.0061*** 0.001851 3.199% 0.9744 -0.0160771 -19.849% 0.0000*** 0.0069557 5.572% 0.3118 0.1141365 49.009% 0.0000*** 
HP -0.0077588 -14.126% 0.0000*** -0.016104 -14.763% 0.0000*** -0.0113537 -8.851% 0.0000*** -0.0199759 -9.890% 0.0000*** 0.0157533 4.099% 0.0553* 
HTC -0.003725 -5.275% 0.1613 -0.002525 -2.143% 0.3405 -0.0024973 -1.512% 0.2816 0.0004978 0.192% 0.3434 0.0004257 0.086% 0.2517 
Intel 0.0043047 13.050% 0.5092 -0.004276 -7.750% 0.2202 0.0039316 5.104% 0.8187 -0.0010345 -0.853% 0.6746 -0.0365701 -15.616% 0.0000*** 
Lenovo 0.0102371 18.645% 0.0146** 0.011486 12.556% 0.0162** 0.0124597 9.726% 0.0179** 0.0139985 6.949% 0.0321** 0.018602 4.836% 0.1394 
LG 0.000351 0.712% 0.2521 0.001102 1.339% 0.2539 0.0016501 1.431% 0.1537 0.002896 1.596% 0.0703* 0.006171 1.773% 0.0135** 
Microsoft 0.0181977 56.926% 0.0000*** 0.018776 35.336% 0.0000*** 0.0193593 26.062% 0.0000*** 0.022122 19.007% 0.0000*** 0.0217213 9.787% 0.0000*** 
MSI 0.0049562 10.350% 0.0114** 0.005665 7.103% 0.0198** 0.0060032 5.379% 0.0746* 0.0072341 4.132% 0.2440 0.0114755 3.454% 0.4076 
Nikon 0.0171088 34.436% 0.0634* 0.018655 22.573% 0.0928* 0.0086438 6.357% 0.0781* 0.0135252 5.910% 0.5243 0.0429294 12.608% 0.0000*** 
Nintendo 0.0285754 48.240% 0.0276** 0.033343 33.813% 0.0131** 0.0325919 23.606% 0.0149** 0.0185822 8.536% 0.1782 0.0395445 9.545% 0.0085*** 
NVidia 0.001823 3.543% 0.8801 0.002797 3.255% 0.6884 0.0039648 3.291% 0.6483 0.0062566 3.294% 0.4482 0.0121079 3.310% 0.2031 
Panasonic 0.0147478 30.203% 0.0083*** 0.018288 22.448% 0.0095*** 0.0219937 19.270% 0.0252** 0.029426 16.394% 0.1742 0.0457329 13.249% 0.2669 
Samsung 0.0016309 4.447% 0.2845 0.001377 2.252% 0.5626 0.0024549 2.868% 0.2770 0.0040737 3.030% 0.0913* 0.0061009 2.374% 0.0734* 
Sony -0.0046684 -8.332% 0.0688* -0.005377 -5.747% 0.0238** -0.00764 -5.819% 0.0021*** -0.0415632 -20.053% 0.0000*** -0.0543106 -13.715% 0.0001*** 
Table 8. Cumulative abnormal risk (“γ” in table) and percental difference from normal/expected conditional volatility (“%” in table) – firm specific. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level
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6.5 Results in relation to the hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: New product announcements do not have an impact on stock prices. 
Since the first event study rejected the null hypothesis of CAAR = 0 and concluded that CAAR 
> 0, this hypothesis is rejected. New product announcements in the consumer electronic 
industry do (historically on average) have an impact on stock prices and this impact is of a 
positive nature. The hypothesis is rejected. 
Hypothesis 2: New product announcements impact stock prices of all firms in the same direction. 
The statistically significant results in Table 6 show that there are firms experiencing positive 
impacts on stock prices when announcing new products, as well as firms experiencing negative 
impacts. The hypothesis is rejected. 
Hypothesis 3: New product announcements do not affect the risk of stock prices. 
The results in Table 8 show that 18 of the 20 firms in the study experience statistically 
significant changes in risk in some of the event windows estimated. Based on this result the 
hypothesis is rejected for all firms except HTC and NVidia.  
Hypothesis 4: The length of the event window does not affect the results. 
Since statistically significant results are of different sizes in differently sized event windows, 
as well as occasionally displaying both negative and positive values depending on the event 
window size, this hypothesis is rejected. 
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7. Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to research if consumer electronic firms experience any stock 
price impact when announcing new products, and to quantify any impact proven to exist. Based 
on the results found and with the help of economic theory, possible explanations to why the 
stock prices of included firms in the study as well as the consumer electronic industry as a 
whole react as they do were to be presented. The result that CAARs associated with new product 
announcements still exist even though they were located decades ago introduces doubt to the 
explanatory power of the efficient market hypothesis. In section 3.2.2 it was mentioned that if 
the efficient market hypothesis were to hold, the market should have been able to learn that new 
product announcements generate excess returns on average and not have the constant need to 
readjust stock prices after each new product announcement. The conclusion is that the event 
windows which hold positive CAARs could possibly be explained by an anomaly of the 
efficient market hypothesis. 
A second possible explanation presented in section 3. Economic Theory was that located 
CAARs act as a risk premium for some hidden excess risk associated with new product 
announcements. It was said that if such risk existed a risk premium might be required by 
investors to carry the excess risk. In order to research the existence of any change in risk the 
second event study was conducted to estimate excess risk for the same event windows. As seen 
in table 7 excess risk was found to exist on average and opens up this explanation as a 
possibility. However, since CAPM advocates that an investor is only compensated for the 
systematic risk, and based on the discussion in section 3.1 where it was deemed unlikely for 
new product announcements to affect the market discount rate, this explanation should be 
approached with much care. 
When comparing the event studies it is seen that the widest event window of 21 days both had 
the highest estimated CAAR and the highest estimated cumulative idiosyncratic risk. The same 
stock reaction but not as large is seen for the 5 day-long event window (- 2, t, + 2) and the 11 
day-long event window (- 5, t, + 5). No excess return was found for the shortest event window 
(- 1, t, + 1) of 3 days, yet this window was estimated to have the largest daily increase in risk 
compared to the estimation window. This result indicates that this time window experiences 
both relatively large returns and relatively large losses (compared to both the estimation 
window and the other event windows) and that they cancel each other out on average. This 
results in excess risk but no excess returns. The same stock reaction but not as large is seen for 
the 7 day-long event window (- 3, t, + 3).  
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A possible explanation to why new product announcements cause an abnormally volatile period 
on average is given by behavioral economics. This explanation stresses the importance of 
expectations, how those expectations may act as a reference point and the loss of utility the 
market players may suffer should the product turn out to be a disappointment. According to the 
results, the stock impacts which occur in the smallest event window do not account for any 
significant positive AARs (only a loss), yet is the most volatile on a daily basis, indicating a 
relatively trade intensive time window. The fact that the AARs are delayed indicates that the 
market needs some time to interpret the announced information and to calibrate. Based on this, 
it is not unreasonable to speculate that the market players incorporate information reported by 
media in the days following the announcement, such as product specifications, how they live 
up to expectations and how they compare to equivalent products of competitors before 
stabilizing in a more homogenous reaction. Media would in this case initiate a phenomenon 
known as the bandwagon effect. The bandwagon effect is the psychological term of a cognitive 
bias where individuals’ probability to adopt a belief is increased with the size of the portion to 
have already done so (Colman, 2003, p. 78). 
The theory that new product announcements are not always received as good news is supported 
by the existence of statistically significant negative CAARs in Table 6. From the behavioral 
economic standpoint this stock price reaction is interpreted as a reflection of the loss in utility 
the investor experiences due to disappointment. According to the discussion about the DDM in 
section 3. Economic Theory the disappointing product announced would decrease investors’ 
expectations of future dividends. 7 of the 18 firms with statistically significant results show 
results of negative CAARs for some event window. This result presents an alternative view of 
new product announcements that prior research left undiscussed. New products may be 
“engines of growth” as so poetically put by Cohen et al. (1997) and they may on average have 
a positive impact on stock prices, but reoccurring negative impacts should not come as a 
surprise to the investor. 
7.1 Trading strategies 
Despite occasional negative impacts and also because of them, different trading strategies can 
be designed that would be expected to generate future abnormal returns. Below follows two 
sections that suggest such strategies. The first section suggests strategies that exploit abnormal 
returns found in the study and the second section suggests strategies that exploit the abnormal 
idiosyncratic risk which was found. 
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7.1.1 Speculation on the abnormal return 
The widest event window (- 10, t, + 10) of 21 days was estimated to generate the largest CAAR, 
so logically the trading strategy to maximize one’s return would be to hold stocks for this period. 
(Or go long on futures contracts or call options with expiration date at the end of the event 
window if the speculator wants to leverage his or her investment.) However, this trading 
strategy has some complications. 1. A new product announcement may not be known to occur 
in advance. As discussed previously in this paper, it is sometimes the case that the 
announcement is expected, such as the early-autumn Apple Launch Event example when Apple 
announces new iPhones, but not all announcements can be predicted. 2. Since the strategy 
begins before the announcement, it is difficult to speculate if the product will live up to 
expectations. 3. None of the estimated AARs occurring previously to the announcement are 
significantly different from zero. 4. This event window was estimated to suffer from the largest 
cumulative abnormal idiosyncratic risk. This additional risk will have to be carried by the 
speculator. These complications may cause the strategy to be perceived as unattractive. 
An alternative trading strategy would be to buy stocks just before the stock exchange closes on 
the day after the announcement. This trading day was estimated to have a significant negative 
AAR and was followed by the trading day to show the largest estimated AAR in the study. The 
speculator is then recommended to hold the stocks to the tenth trading day after the 
announcement, thus including the expected positive AAR estimated for the ninth trading day. 
(Long positions can be used for this trading strategy as well if the speculator wants to leverage 
his or her investment.) This trading strategy has the advantage that the stocks are bought by the 
end of a trading day expected to generate a negative return and then contains both trading days 
expected to generate positive returns. What makes this trading strategy even more powerful is 
that it takes place post-announcement. This eliminates the complication that the announcement 
may not be public knowledge which the first strategy suffered from. The trading strategy offers 
one more critical advantage. Since it starts by the end of the trading day after the announcement 
day, speculators may have time to include information about the reception published by media 
of how product specifications live up to expectations and speculations. Should it be the case 
that the product does not live up to expectations and speculations, the speculator may have time 
to decide whether or not to adopt the strategy for the current announcement.  
Below is an illustration of expected CAAR when adopting the trading strategy just described. 
A confidence interval at the 95% level is applied to the sell price. 
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Figure 9. Trading strategy with $100 investment example and 95% confidence interval for expected sell price (general market 
movements affecting the stock prices excluded). 
An additional estimation of excess risk was conducted to facilitate the analysis of above trading 
strategy. The daily increase in conditional volatility was estimated to 5.412%, which makes it 
about as risky as the first trading strategy on a daily basis. However, since this strategy is over 
a shorter time period, the cumulative abnormal conditional volatility is estimated to 0.0076. 
This is less than half the cumulative abnormal conditional volatility of 0.0171 the 21 day-long 
event window was estimated to suffer from. 
7.1.2 Speculation on the abnormal risk 
In section 3. Economic Theory some trading strategies involving two or more options were 
described. Based on the result that the stock prices of examined firms, on average, experience 
an increase in idiosyncratic risk when announcing new products, would suggest the appropriate 
trading strategies to be from the group called combinations if a stock of a consumer electronic 
firm is the underlying asset. For the three event windows with positive CAARs a positive 
increase in price is expected to be more likely for the stocks than a loss in value resulting in the 
strap to be the trading strategy to be recommended. The longest event window is estimated to 
have the highest cumulative abnormal idiosyncratic risk and is consequently expected to 
generate the highest profit of the three.  
Event windows (- 1, t, + 1) and (- 3, t, + 3) show no proof of CAARs but both experience 
increases in idiosyncratic risk on average. Based on this, the straddle (which does not reward a 
loss or return more than the other) is the recommended trading strategy. The 3 day-long window 
was estimated to have a cumulative abnormal risk greater than that of the 7 day-long window, 
resulting in the trading strategy involving the shorter window to appear more appealing. 
For trading strategies involving stocks of a specific firm as the underlying asset refer to 
statistically significant γ’s in Table 8. The higher the γ the more attractive the trading strategy. 
If the γ is positive an increase in idiosyncratic risk associated with new product announcement 
is expected on average and one of the combinations is the appropriate choice. If γ is negative 
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the opposite holds and the butterfly spread is the appropriate choice22. If a statistically 
significant result is found in the corresponding cell of Table 6 and γ is positive, this information 
can be used to decide whether to use a strip (if the CAAR is negative) or a strap (if the CAAR 
is positive).  
7.2 Comparison with previous research 
The main result found in this study that new product announcements on average have a positive 
impact on stock prices is (despite the generally accepted assumption of market efficiency) the 
same as the previous studies conducted by Chaney et al. (1991) and Lee & Chen (2009). 
However, this is where the similarities end. Chaney et al. (1991) found that the smaller the event 
window, the greater the CAAR. In this study the opposite was found; the event window to show 
the greatest stock price impact on average was the widest window of 21 days. Lee & Chen 
(2009) found that the day before the announcement as well as the announcement day were the 
days that experienced the greatest impacts, while this study found no significant impact for 
these days. The fact that the results found in this study diverge from results found in previous 
similar research is hardly surprising. Neither is it a unique characteristic for this study. The 
same pattern is seen when comparing previous studies. The study conducted by Eddy & 
Saunders (1980) is such an example, where no excess returns were found. To fully understand 
the divergence consider the components of the study. In broad terms the two main components 
are the method applied and the sample used. The first event study that was conducted in this 
study estimated abnormal returns for the event window by calculating the difference between 
actual returns and normal/expected returns which were estimated with the market model. This 
methodology is very similar to the methodology adopted in previous research, but a difference 
is the size of the event windows. However, since this study estimated AARs for all days over a 
21 day-long window (which subsequently were presented in differently sized windows), 
differences in CAAR caused by differently sized windows would be easy to notice had they 
existed. Where the true difference lies is in the other component; the sample. The samples are 
different in multiple ways. They are different in length, in firms included, in announcements 
and most importantly, in time. In section 2.2 it was mentioned that discovered trends on the 
stock market tend to disappear as the word spreads, since investors seek to exploit them to make 
an easy profit. This is partly what is seen when comparing this study on new data with research 
                                                          
22 Have in mind that the risk estimated is the idiosyncratic risk corrected for market movements. If the market is 
experiencing a particularly volatile period the butterfly spread might be inappropriate even though a firm on 
average has experienced less volatility during event windows compared to the estimation window. 
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on old data. CAARs still exist but the trend that the CAARs were diminishing as the event 
window widened found in previous research is in this study found to no longer exist. In this 
study the widest event window is the window to show the highest excess return. That results 
differ over time should not be seen as disconcerting, but as motivating to keep the research up 
to date.  
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 Future research 
Proposals for future research are strongly connected to the limitations of this study. The most 
obvious direction for future research would be to apply the same methodology to different 
industries. An industry of particular interest is the pharmaceutical industry since previous 
research has found this industry to be particularly sensitive to new product announcements. A 
next step would be to expand the research by applying the same methodology to all industries 
and eventually the market as a whole.  
Future research could also be conducted within the consumer electronic industry to create an 
even greater understanding of the industry. This could be done by categorizing announcements 
and estimate stock price impacts for each category. For example one category could include 
announcements of flagship products, another announcements of multiple products and a third 
announcements of minor products. A careful definition of which products belong to which 
category would have to be made to minimize the problem of ambiguity.  
A proposal of future research in an entirely different direction is to study long term economic 
effects by new product introductions. Pauwels et al. (2003) have already conducted such 
research in their study “The Long-Term Impact of New-Product Introductions and Promotions on 
Financial Performance and Firm Value”. However, this study only includes six car manufacturing firms. 
Conducting such a study on a grander scale would provide firms with important information of what to 
expect on the long term when launching new products.  
The last proposal is to test the suggested trading strategies and see if they generate any abnormal returns 
after transaction costs. This would be a very interesting contribution to the research conducted in this 
study. 
8.2 Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this study was to expand our understanding of firm value reactions when 
consumer electronic firms announce new products and to complement similar previous 
research. Some interesting results that were hypothesized are now confirmed. This study 
concludes that the stocks of consumer electronic firms have historically experienced excess 
returns as well as excess idiosyncratic risk on average when announcing new products. An 
anomaly of the efficient market hypothesis as well as the less likely case of the CAAR acting 
as a compensation for the abnormal risk in relation to CAPM were presented as possible 
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explanations to why CAAR exist on average. Behavioral economics offers explanations to why 
new product announcements are associated with this temporary increase in idiosyncratic risk.  
The event window to show the largest abnormal return was the widest window, consisting of 
21 days. This window was also estimated to suffer from the highest cumulative abnormal 
idiosyncratic risk. Returns from the second and ninth trading days after the announcement 
contribute most to the CAAR. The shortest event window of 3 days was found to be the most 
volatile on a daily basis.  
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Appendix 
Announcements 
Product Date Source 
Acer Inc.   
 Z220, Z520 
Phones 
2015-03-01 http://us.acer.com/ac/en/US/press/2015/152995  
 Aspire R13, 
R14 
2014-09-03 http://us.acer.com/ac/en/US/press/2014/81628  
 Liquid 
Phones 
2014-05-30 http://us.acer.com/ac/en/US/press/2014/78450  
 Liquid S2 2013-09-02 http://us.acer.com/ac/en/US/press/2013/66580  
 Aspire S5 
Ultrabook 
2012-01-08 http://us.acer.com/ac/en/US/press/2012/28709  
Amazon.com 
Inc. 
  
 Fire TV Stick 2014-10-27 http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1981713  
 Fire Phone 2014-06-18 http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1940902  
 Fire TV 2014-04-02 http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1915168  
 Kindle Fire 
HDX 
2013-09-17 http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1969157  
 Kindle Fire 
HD 
2012-09-06 http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1732546  
 Kindle Fire 2011-09-28 http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1610968  
AMD, Inc.   
 R9 285 
Graphics 
2014-08-23 http://www.amd.com/en-us/press-releases/Pages/amd-launches-r9285-2014sep02.aspx  
 R9 295X2 2014-04-08 http://www.amd.com/en-us/press-releases/Pages/fastest-graphics-card-2014apr8.aspx  
 R7, R9 Series 2013-09-25 http://www.amd.com/en-us/press-releases/Pages/amd-radeon-r9-2013sept25.aspx  
 HD 7990 2013-04-24 
http://www.amd.com/en-us/press-releases/Pages/amd-unleashes-worlds-fastest-
2013apr24.aspx  
 HD 7970 
GHz 
2012-06-22 http://www.amd.com/en-us/press-releases/Pages/amd-takes-graphics-2012jun22.aspx  
 HD 7970 2011-12-22 
http://www.amd.com/en-us/press-releases/Pages/amd-launches-worlds-fastest-
2011dec22.aspx  
 HD 6990 2011-03-08 http://www.amd.com/en-us/press-releases/Pages/amd-extends-graphics-2011mar08.aspx  
 HD 6900 
Series 
2010-12-15 http://www.amd.com/en-us/press-releases/Pages/6900-series-graphics-2010dec15.aspx  
Apple Inc.   
 iPhone 6, 6+ 2014-09-09 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/09/09Apple-Announces-iPhone-6-iPhone-6-Plus-
The-Biggest-Advancements-in-iPhone-History.html  
 iPhone 5S, 
5C 
2013-09-10 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2013/09/10Apple-Announces-iPhone-5s-The-Most-
Forward-Thinking-Smartphone-in-the-World.html  
 iPhone 5 2012-09-12 http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/09/12Apple-Introduces-iPhone-5.html  
 iPhone 4S 2011-10-04 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/10/04Apple-Launches-iPhone-4S-iOS-5-
iCloud.html  
 iPhone 4 2010-06-07 http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2010/06/07Apple-Presents-iPhone-4.html  
ASUSTeK 
Computer 
Inc. 
  
 ZenBook Pro 
UX501 
2015-03-13 http://www.asus.com/News/aYrdne2zge3Rp27m  
 ZenBook 
UX305 
2015-02-09 http://www.asus.com/News/SQPFP4ijdnPDTj2M  
 ZenBook 
UX303 
2014-10-08 http://www.asus.com/News/sImMdBUarWTBDsHB  
 ZenBook 
NX500 
2014-06-02 http://www.asus.com/News/OpnWO7N8R64fFYCx  
 ZenFone 2014-01-03 
http://press.asus.com/PressReleases/p/ASUS-Announces-ZenFone-4-ZenFone-5-and-
ZenFone-6#.VQ2QeeGYI7A  
 Zenbook 
Infinity 
2013-06-03 
http://www.gizbot.com/tablet-pc-laptop/asus-zenbook-infinity-with-gorilla-glass-3-
protection-012383.html  
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UX32A/UX3
2VD 
2012-04-10 
http://ultrabooknews.com/2012/05/10/asus-announces-ivy-bridge-ux32aux32vd-
zenbook-ultrabooks-with-discrete-nvidia-graphics-and-more-ports-video/  
 ZenBook 2011-10-11 
http://techcrunch.com/2011/10/11/asus-zenbooks-enter-the-ultrabook-fray-starting-at-
999/  
Canon 
U.S.A., Inc. 
  
 Multiple 
cameras  
2015-02-05 
http://www.usa.canon.com/cusa/about_canon/newsroom/press_releases?pageKeyCo
de=pressrelsearch&month=2&year=2015&x=14&y=8&category=&searchPhrase=#  
 Multiple 
cameras 
2014-02-11 
http://www.usa.canon.com/cusa/about_canon/newsroom/press_releases?pageKeyCo
de=pressrelsearch&month=2&year=2014&x=19&y=9&category=&searchPhrase=#  
 Multiple 
cameras 
2013-03-21 
http://www.usa.canon.com/cusa/about_canon/newsroom/press_releases?pageKeyCo
de=pressrelsearch&month=3&year=2013&x=13&y=5&category=&searchPhrase=#  
 CES 2012-01-09 
http://www.usa.canon.com/cusa/about_canon/newsroom/press_releases?pageKeyCo
de=pressreldetail&docId=0901e02480420024  
Google Inc.   
 Nexus 6, 9 2014-10-15 
http://www.cnet.com/news/google-unveils-nexus-9-tablet-nexus-6-phone-nexus-player-
streamer/  
 Android 
Wear 
2014-03-18 
http://www.theverge.com/2014/3/18/5522226/google-reveals-android-wear-an-
operating-system-designed-for  
 Nexus 5 2013-10-31 http://googleblog.blogspot.se/2013/10/android-for-all-and-new-nexus-5.html  
 Google Glass 2012-04-04 https://plus.google.com/+GoogleGlass/posts/aKymsANgWBD  
 Nexus One 2010-01-05 https://sites.google.com/a/pressatgoogle.com/nexusone/press-release  
Hewlett-
Packard 
Company 
  
  Pavilion 
Mini Desktop 
2015-01-05 http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1866916#.VTYkVZNc47A  
  ENVY, 
Pavilion x360 
2nd gen 
2014-06-01 http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1697420#.VTYlrpNc47A  
 Pavilion x360  2014-02-23 http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1575336#.VTYpCJNc47A  
 ENVY 
Recline series 
2013-09-05 http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1470129#.VTYqI5Nc47A  
 Pavilion 14 
Chromebook 
2013-02-04 http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1366400#.VTYrGZNc47A  
 AiO PCs 2012-09-10 http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1291545#.VTYsO5Nc47A  
 Multiple PC 2012-05-09 http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1232177#.VTYs6JNc47A  
 AiO PCs 2011-09-07 http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1065256#.VTYtZJNc47A  
HTC 
Corporation 
  
 One (M9) 2015-02-01 
http://www.timesnews.co.uk/3841-htc-one-m9-launched-at-mwc-2015-with-snapdragon-
810-octa-core-processor/  
 One (M8) 2014-03-25 http://www.anandtech.com/show/7892/htc-launches-the-one-2014-formerly-m8  
 One  2013-02-19 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJRaAdghpo0  
 One X 2012-02-26 
http://www.theverge.com/2012/2/26/2824075/htc-one-x-launch-release-date-specs-tegra-
3-720p-android-4  
 Sensation 2011-04-12 http://www.tmonews.com/2011/04/watch-the-htc-sensation-announcement-online/  
Intel 
Corporation 
  
 5th Gen 
Processors 
2015-01-05 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/05/intel-unveils-new-flagship-broadwell-chips-for-
pcs/?KEYWORDS=intel  
 4th Gen 
Processors 
2013-06-04 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmoorhead/2013/06/04/intels-newest-core-processors-
all-about-graphics-and-low-power/  
 3rd Gen 
Processors 
2012-04-23 
http://newsroom.intel.com/community/intel_newsroom/blog/2012/04/23/3rd-generation-
intel-core-processors-bring-exciting-new-experiences-and-fun-to-the-pc 
 2nd Gen 
Processors 
2011-01-06 http://www.cnet.com/news/ces-intel-debuts-2nd-gen-sandy-bridge-core-i-series-cpus/  
Lenovo 
Group 
  
 YOGA 
Laptop 
2015-01-05 http://news.lenovo.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1876  
 YOGA 
Tablet 2 
2014-10-09 http://news.lenovo.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1843  
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 ThinkPad X1 
Carbon 
2014-01-05 http://news.lenovo.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1743  
 ThinPad 
Ultrabook 
2013-06-18 http://news.lenovo.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1697  
 Smartphone 
Portfolio 
2013-01-07 
http://news.lenovo.com/news+releases/lenovo-launches-new-smartphone-
portfolio.htm  
 IdeaPad 
Ultrabook 
2012-08-31 http://news.lenovo.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1625  
 IdeaPad 
YOGA 
2012-01-09 http://news.lenovo.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1551  
 ThinkPad 
X220 
2011-03-08 http://news.lenovo.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1427  
LG 
Electronics 
Inc. 
  
 G Flex 2 2015-02-11 http://www.lg.com/hk_en/press-releases/lg-g-flex-2-evolution-of-lgs-curved-smartphone  
 G3 2014-05-27 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ez0l1iBX83A  
 Curved 
OLED TV 
2013-10-03 http://www.lg.com/hk_en/press-releases/lg-curved-oled-tv  
 G2 2013-08-07 http://live.cnet.com/Event/LG_G2_press_event?Page=0  
 Smartphones 2012-02-26 http://www.lgnewsroom.com/newsroom/contents/62070  
 3D TV 2011-03-30 
http://www.lg.com/hk_en/press-releases/lg-2011-the-next-generation-3d-tv-launch-
event-lg-electronics-announces-a-breakthrough-in-3d-technologies-enhancing-homes-
with  
Microsoft 
Corporation 
  
 Hololens 2015-01-21 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aAKfdeOX3-o  
 Surface Pro 3 2014-05-20 
http://news.microsoft.com/2014/05/20/microsoft-introduces-surface-pro-3-the-tablet-
that-can-replace-your-laptop/  
 Surface 2, 
Pro 2 
2013-09-23 
http://news.microsoft.com/2013/09/23/microsoft-unveils-surface-2-surface-pro-2-and-
new-accessories/ 
 Xbox One 2013-05-21 http://www.ign.com/articles/2013/05/21/xbox-720-is-called-xbox-one  
 Surface 
Tablet PC 
2012-06-18 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/257840/microsoft_announces_new_surface_tablet_p
c.html  
MSI Co., Ltd   
 GE72/GE62 2015-03-13 http://www.msi.com/news/2009.html  
 GT80 Titan 2014-10-31 http://www.msi.com/news/1885.html  
 Multiple 2014-03-25 http://www.msi.com/news/1695.html  
 GS70 2013-06-04 http://www.msi.com/news/1559.html  
 GT60, GT70 2012-03-01 http://www.msi.com/news/1377.html  
 GT780, 
GT683, 
GE620 
2011-05-31 http://www.msi.com/news/1255.html  
Nikon 
Corporation 
  
 Multiple 
cameras 
2015-02-09 
http://www.nikonusa.com/en/About-Nikon/Press-Room/Press-
Release/i5shbv4v/Compact%2C-Tough-and-Ready%2C-Nikon%27s-New-Rugged-
COOLPIX-AW130-and-Family-Friendly-COOLPIX-S33-Combine-Durability-with-
Impressive-Imaging-Prowess.html  
 Multiple 
cameras 
2014-02-06 
http://www.nikonusa.com/en/About-Nikon/Press-Room/Press-Release/hrafh7gk/The-
Waterproof%2C-Shockproof-and-Freezeproof-Nikon-COOLPIX-AW120-is-an-
Exciting-Option-for-Those-Who-Want-to-Take-Photos-When-They%27re-in-the-
Action%2C-Instead-of-Watching-It.html  
 Multiple 
cameras 
2013-01-07 
http://www.nikonusa.com/en/About-Nikon/Press-Room/Press-Release/hbje2hwx/Nikon-
Expands-the-Nikon-1-System-with-the-Announcement-of-the-Nikon-1-J3-and-Nikon-1-
S1-as-well-as-the-New-1-NIKKOR-VR-6.7-13mm-f%252F3.5-5.6-and-VR-10-100mm-
f%252F4-5.6-Lenses.html  
 Multiple 
cameras 
2012-01-31 
www.nikonusa.com/en/About-Nikon/Press-Room/Press-
Release/h1jhd6hz/Nikon%E2%80%99s-New-S-Series-COOLPIX-Cameras-Are-The-
Slim%2C-Stylish-And-Smart-Way-To-Capture-Life%E2%80%99s-Great-Moments.html  
 Multiple 
cameras 
2011-02-08 
www.nikonusa.com/en/About-Nikon/Press-Room/Press-
Release/h1jhd6ct/Nikon%E2%80%99s-Newest-COOLPIX-Digital-Cameras-Are-The-
Easy-Way-To-Amazing-Images%2C-Preserving-Memories%2C-Capturing-HD-Video-
Or-Sharing-Photos-With-Friends-And-Family.html  
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Nintendo Co. 
Ltd. 
  
 2DS 2013-08-28 http://www.ign.com/articles/2013/08/28/nintendo-announces-2ds  
 3DS XL/LL 2012-06-22 http://www.nintendo.co.jp/corporate/release/en/2012/120622.html  
 Wii U 2011-04-25 http://www.nintendo.co.jp/ir/pdf/2011/110425_4e.pdf  
 3DS 2010-03-23 http://www.nintendo.co.jp/ir/pdf/2010/100323e.pdf  
NVidia 
Corporation 
  
 GTX Titan X 2015-03-04 http://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2015/03/04/smaug/  
 GTX 900 
series 
2014-09-18 
http://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-unveils-full-power-of-maxwell-gpu-
architecture-with-breakthroughs-in-performance-graphics-efficiency  
 GTX 780Ti 2013-11-07 
http://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-unveils-geforce-gtx-780-ti-the-best-gaming-
gpu-on-the-planet  
 GTX 780 2013-05-23 
http://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/new-nvidia-geforce-gtx-780-gpu-leads-the-industry-
with-the-fastest-frame-rates-and-super-smooth-animation-for-next-generation-gaming  
 GTX Titan 2013-02-19 
http://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-introduces-geforce-gtx-titan-dna-of-the-
world-s-fastest-supercomputer-powered-by-world-s-fastest-gpu  
 GTX 690 2012-04-28 
http://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-unveils-geforce-gtx-690-dual-graphics-card-
combines-world-s-fastest-gaming-performance-with-sleek-sexy-design  
 GTX 580 2010-11-09 http://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-delivers-world-s-fastest-dx11-gpu-again  
Panasonic 
Corporation 
  
 CES 2015-01-05 
http://www2.panasonic.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/PressroomHome?storeId=11301
&catGroupId=30531&sortByDate=TDown&startIndex=11&catalogId=13251  
 AX800 4K 
UHD TV 
2014-10-30 
http://www2.panasonic.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/prModelDetail?storeId=11301&c
atalogId=13251&itemId=714006&modelNo=Content10302014014144007&surfModel=
Content10302014014144007  
 CES 2014-01-06 
http://www2.panasonic.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/PressroomHome?storeId=11301
&catGroupId=30531&sortByDate=TDown&startIndex=121&catalogId=13251  
 LUMIX LX7 2012-07-18 
http://www2.panasonic.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/prModelDetail?storeId=11301&c
atalogId=13251&itemId=681506&modelNo=Content07182012123450403&Viera  
 Viera smart 2012-01-09 http://www.bigbrownboxblog.com.au/av-talk/panasonic-announces-17-new-plasma-tvs  
 Viera IPS 2011-05-23 
https://blogs.panasonic.com.au/consumer/2011/05/23/panasonic-announces-new-range-
of-viera-ips-led-lcd-tvs/  
Samsung 
Electronics 
Co. Ltd. 
  
 Galaxy S6, 
Edge 
2015-03-01 
http://www.samsungmobilepress.com/2015/03/02/Beautifully-Crafted-from-Metal-and-
Glass,-Samsung-Galaxy-S6-and-Galaxy-S6-edge-Define-Whats-Next-in-Mobility  
 Galaxy S5 2014-02-24 
http://www.samsung.com/us/aboutsamsung/news/newsIrRead.do?news_ctgry=irnewsrel
ease&page=2&news_seq=22549&rdoPeriod=ALL&from_dt=&to_dt=&search_Galaxy  
 Galaxy S4 2013-06-12 
http://www.samsung.com/us/aboutsamsung/news/newsIrRead.do?news_ctgry=irnewsrel
ease&page=10&news_seq=21007&rdoPeriod=ALL&from_dt=&to_dt=&search_Galaxy  
 Galaxy SIII 2012-05-03 
http://www.samsungmobilepress.com/2012/05/03/Samsung-Introduces-the-GALAXY-S-
III,-the-Smartphone--Designed-for-Humans-and-Inspired-by-Nature-1  
 Galaxy SII 2011-02-13 
http://www.samsungmobilepress.com/2011/02/13/Samsung-announces-the-GALAXY-S-
II,-Worlds-thinnest-Smartphone-that-Will-Let-You-Experience-More-with-Less-1  
 Galaxy S 2010-03-23 
http://www.samsungmobilepress.com/2010/03/23/Samsung-Welcomes-You-to-the-
35;38;DquotSmart-Life35;38;Dquot-with-the-Global-Launch-of-the-Galaxy-S  
Sony 
Corporation 
  
 Xperia Z3 2014-09-03 http://blogs.sonymobile.com/2014/09/03/sony-mobile-live-at-ifa-2014/  
 Xperia Z2 2014-02-24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PoUzAbvbAB4  
 Xperia Z1 2013-09-04 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05gIlc4AH6c&list=UU1-
FEEq7mbq5NwzJhTqyspA#t=543  
 PlayStation 4 2013-02-20 http://www.scei.co.jp/corporate/release/pdf/130221a_e.pdf  
 Xperia Z 2013-01-07 
http://www.androidpolice.com/2013/01/07/eyes-on-announcement-the-xperia-z-and-zl-
from-sonys-ces-2013-press-conference/  
 IFA 2012-08-29 http://live.theverge.com/sony-ifa-2012-event-live-blog/  
 IFA 2011-08-31 http://www.engadget.com/2011/08/31/live-from-sony-ifa-2011-press-event/  
Table 9. Announcements and sources. 
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Stock exchange and index  
Firm Index Stock Exchange 
Acer Inc. 
Taiwan Capitalization 
Weighted Stock Index 
Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Amazon.com Inc. NASDAQ Composite NASDAQ 
AMD, Inc NASDAQ Composite NASDAQ 
Apple Inc. NASDAQ Composite NASDAQ 
ASUSTeK Computer Inc. 
Taiwan Capitalization 
Weighted Stock Index 
Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Canon U.S.A., Inc. S&P500 Composite New York Stock Exchange 
Google Inc. NASDAQ Composite NASDAQ 
Hewlett-Packard Company S&P500 Composite New York Stock Exchange 
HTC Corporation 
Taiwan Capitalization 
Weighted Stock Index 
Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Intel Corporation NASDAQ Composite NASDAQ 
Lenovo Group 
Hang Seng China-Affiliated 
Corporation Index 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
LG Electronics Inc. KOSPI Korea Exchange 
Microsoft Corporation NASDAQ Composite NASDAQ 
MSI Co., Ltd 
Taiwan Capitalization 
Weighted Stock Index 
Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Nikon Corporation NIKKEI 225 Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Nintendo Co. Ltd. NIKKEI 225 Tokyo Stock Exchange 
 Nvidia Corporation  NASDAQ Composite NASDAQ 
Panasonic Corporation NIKKEI 225 Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Samsung Electronics Co. 
Ltd. 
KOSPI Korea Exchange 
Sony Corporation S&P500 Composite New York Stock Exchange 
Table 10. Indices used in market model and their stock exchange. 
 
 
 
